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DEFENDING TAIWAN: COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE OF A
CONTESTED STATE
Major Ryan M Fisher*
China's bold threats of war against Taiwan draw increasing attention
to the unsettled nature of Taiwan's status in international law. Although
Taiwan exhibits many, if not all, of the characteristics of recognized
states, it has failed to gain widespread state recognition in the
international community. Without statehood, the security of Taiwan faces
considerable risk because its right to self-defense under international law
is contested. Highlighting this legal ambiguity, the People's Republic of
China (P.R.C.) declares that Taiwan must be reunited with Mainland
China-even if it requires the use of force. This Article develops the
historical and legal relationship between Taiwan and Mainland China and
explains the conditions required for Taiwan to lawfully receive collective
self-defense, most particularly from the United States. It develops the
conditions required by examining the following principles of
international law: state recognition, the right to self-determination and
secession, the prohibition on the use of force, and national and collective
self-defense. Although this Article explains Taiwan already enjoys nearly
every aspect of formal state recognition, and thus should receive all the
rights and obligations of widely accepted states, it ultimately argues that
international law permits third-party states to exercise collective selfdefense of Taiwan only if third-party states first formally recognize
Taiwan's independence.
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INTRODUCTION

In October 1949, the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) defeated the
Republic of China (R.O.C.), winning the twenty-two-year Chinese Civil
War. The P.R.C. established itself as the legitimate government of China,
settling the dispute over the governance of Mainland China.1 But the
P.R.C.'s victory also created a new conflict over the proper sovereign of
the island of Taiwan. After the R.O.C. lost the civil war, it moved its
governmental headquarters to the island of Taiwan and established itself
as Taiwan's effective government. 2 For the last 70 years, the R.O.C. has
controlled Taiwan with an independent government, including an
independent military, economy, immigration system, and international
relationships.
Despite Taiwan's independent government, the P.R.C. claims it is the
legitimate government of both Mainland China and Taiwan. The P.R.C.
asserts that the R.O.C. government in Taiwan is merely a rebellious
separatist group, and the China-Taiwan dispute is purely an internal

1. LUNG-CHU CHEN, THE U.S.-TAIWAN-CHINA RELATIONSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

15 (2016).
2. Tzu-wen Lee, The International Legal Status of the Republic of China on Taiwan,
UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFFS., 351, 353 (1996).
AND POLICY
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conflict. 3 Despite the P.R.C.'s claim, the P.R.C. government has never
exercised any control over Taiwan.
Since the P.R.C. defeated the R.O.C. in 1949, tension between the two
governments has remained high. Over the last decade the P.R.C. has
repeatedly emphasized its willingness to use force to re-unify Taiwan. 4
Additionally, the P.R.C.'s Army (the Peoples Liberation Army, or PLA)
appears to be preparing for military conflict across the Taiwan Strait and
throughout Southeast Asia. 5 Official statements from the P.R.C. suggest
that over one-third of the budget the P.R.C. dedicates to defense is
focused specifically on the mission of preventing Taiwan's
independence. 6 The P.R.C.'s aggressive position about Taiwan is
consistent with the nature of the P.R.C.'s territorial assertions and
militarization of the South China Sea. 7 With the constant threat of
hostilities, it is essential to understand how international law impacts the
conflict between Taiwan and China.
The international law debate surrounding the China-Taiwan conflict
centers on whether Taiwan is a state or simply a rebellious province. Due
to countries around the world wanting to maintain a good relationship
with the P.R.C., few nations are willing to openly support Taiwanese
political independence. Today, fourteen United Nations (U.N.) member
states recognize Taiwan as a state, and Taiwan engages in "unofficial"
state relations with fifty-seven other states, including the United States
(U.S.). 8 The U.S. may be the clearest example of a state with "unofficial,"
3. Margaret K. Lewis, Forging Taiwan's Legal Identity, 44 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 489, 490

(2019).
4. See Chris Buckley & Chris Horton, Xi Jinping Warns Taiwan That Unification Is the
Goal and Force Is an Option, N.Y. TuMEs (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/01/
world/asia/xi-jinping-taiwan-china.html (discussing the recent statement made by the president of
China, Xi Jinping, that unification with Taiwan is unstoppable, and that China "make[s] no

promise to abandon the use of force, and retain[s] the option of taking all necessary measures,"
including using force against any "intervention by external forces.")
5. See Michael J. Green & Andrew Shearer, Countering China's Militarization of the

Indo-Pacific, WAR ON

THE

ROCKS (Apr. 23, 2018), https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/

countering-chinas-militarization-of-the-indo-pacific/ (discussing how China is building and
planning large infrastructure projects in Vanuatu, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, etc., and that
these projects could easily turn into military projection points. Also, China's "Belt and Road
Project" is leveraging other nations' debt for control and regional influence).

6. Michael Beckley, The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia: How China's
Neighbors Can Check Chinese Naval Expansion, 42 INT'L SEC. 78, 83-84 (2017) (describing the
PLA's primary war fighting mission as "conquering Taiwan" and the resources currently being
used for this mission.).
7. Steven Stashwick, China'sSouth China Sea MilitarizationHas Peaked, FOREIGN POL'Y
(Aug. 19, 2019, 4:12 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/19/chinas-south-china-seamilitarization-has-peaked/ [https://perma.cc/8SH4-QYFL].

8. Embassies & Missions, M[NISTRY

OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS REPUBLIC OF CHINA (TAIWAN),

https://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/Content List.aspx?n=D7B7F1B4196DD582

[https://perma.cc/WE

B8-K6AC] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
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yet quasi-formal, relations with Taiwan. The strong political and
economic ties between the U.S. and Taiwan are highlighted by multibillion-dollar military sales agreements and extensive international
trade. 9
If China attempts to aggressively re-unify Taiwan, the most vital
issue, and the focus of this paper, is whether international law permits
third-party nations to exercise collective self-defense of Taiwan. That
issue depends primarily on whether international law permits third-party
nations to enter a conflict over a contested state.
To answer this question, this Article will explain the historical
relationship between China and Taiwan, along with the development of
treaties and agreements that impact Taiwan's claim to sovereignty. Then,
it will establish the framework of international law that controls the
China-Taiwan conflict. Specifically, this Article will examine the laws of
state recognition, self-determination, the prohibition on the use of force,
and self-defense. After reviewing these laws, this Article will examine
whether these laws allow third-party nations, specifically the U.S., to use
force to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese armed attack.
Ultimately, this Article argues the U.S. has a valid international legal
basis to exercise collective self-defense of Taiwan against an armed
attack by China.
II. HISTORY OF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF TAIWAN
The relationship between China and Taiwan has several distinct
periods, all of which influence Taiwan's status as a contested state. The
first period lasted from the early 17th century to the late 19th century,
when China formed its first official ties and eventually exercised
governance over Taiwan. The second period began after Japan took
control of Taiwan under the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki. During this
period, two separate governments emerged in China-first, the R.O.C.,
and later the P.R.C. 10 The last and current period started after the end of
World War II (WWII) when Japan surrendered control over Taiwan to
the R.O.C.
A. First Period: The Emergence of China'sInfluence Over Taiwan
The first Mainland Chinese government to exercise control over
Taiwan was the Ming Dynasty in the 17th century. In 1661, a Ming
Dynasty military leader took control of Taiwan while fleeing from the

9. SUSAN V. LAWRENCE & WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44996, TAIWAN:
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 29 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44996.pdf [https://perma.ec/XD7C

-9NZ2].
10. Lee, supra note 2.
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invading forces of the Qing Dynasty." In 1683, the Qing Dynasty
eventually overthrew what remained of the Ming Dynasty's influence on
Taiwan, and Taiwan officially became part of the Chinese Qing Empire. 12
Over the next two hundred years, Chinese authorities exercised
sovereignty over Taiwan with formal systems to control the economy,
immigration, and security threats posed by rebellions and Taiwanese
aborigines.' 3 Starting in the 1830s, as European powers competed for
control over trade in Asia, disputes arose over the control of Taiwan's
eastern seaboard.1 4 In 1858, during the beginning of the Second Opium
War between China and Great Britain, China signed the Tianjin Treaties
with the U.S., Great Britain, and France. The Tianjin Treaties formally
granted the western nations access to specific Taiwanese ports.' 5
Although historians generally consider these treaties as a low point in
China's history (because China relinquished control over parts of its
territory), they solidified China's control over Taiwan.1 6 China's control
over Taiwan continued until the Sino-Japanese war, which resulted in the
1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki. Through this treaty, China surrendered
control of Taiwan to Japan indefinitely.'7 Not long after China lost the
Sino-Japanese War, a battle for control of Mainland China developed.
B. Second Period: Development of the R.O.C., P.R.C., and the Chinese
Civil War
Within twenty years of the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War in
1895, two separate revolutionary Governments formed in China-and a
civil war soon broke out. In 1912, Dr. Sun Yat-sen led a revolutionary
movement that overthrew the Qing Dynasty and formed a democratic
government called the R.O.C.1 8 Following Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek
11.

CHEN,

supra note 1, at 8-9.

12. Jonathan I. Charney & J. R. V. Prescott, Resolving Cross-StraitRelations between
China and Taiwan, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 453, 454 (2000).

13. JOHN

ROBERT SHEPHERD, STATECRAFT

AND POLITICAL ECONOMY ON THE TAIWAN

FRONTIER: 1600-1800 4-5 (1993).
14. Charney & Prescott, supra note 12, at 456.
15. Treaty of Peace, Amity and Commerce, China-U.S., June 18, 1858, 119 Consol. T.S.

123; Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Commerce, June 26, 1858, China-Gr. Brit., 119 Consol. T.S.
163; Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, June 27, 1858, China-Fr., 119 Consol. T.S.

189.
16. Charney & Prescott, supra note 12, at 456.

17. Treaty of Shimonoseki, China-Japan, art. 2, Apr. 17, 1895, 181 Consol. T.S. 217.
18. Lawrence W. Beer, Republic of China Constitutionalism in Asia: Asian views of the
American Influence, 89 OCCASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINT SERIES IN CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD. 35, 36
(1988),
https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1088&context
=mscas (The Editorial Note authored by Hungdah Chiu discusses the geography, population and
education, history, economy, constitutional development and government structure, and legal
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took control of the R.O.C. in 1925 and unsuccessfully attempted to unify
China. 19 In 1929, the R.O.C. started a civil war against the newly formed
Communist Party of China, which Mao Zedong later transformed into the
People's Republic of China (P.R.C.). 20 The civil war between the R.O.C.
and the P.R.C. lasted until 1937, when Japan again invaded Northern
China. 2 1 At this point, the P.R.C. and R.O.C. reached a temporary truce
in order to jointly fight the Japanese. 2 2 Although this invasion was called
the Second Sino-Japanese War, it was essentially the beginning of the
Pacific Theater of WWII. 23
The R.O.C. was the effective government of China at both the
commencement and conclusion of WWII. The R.O.C. represented China
in the founding of the U.N. and became a permanent member of the U.N.
Security Council (U.N.S.C.). 24 Following the war's end in 1945, U.S.
Forces allowed the R.O.C. to occupy Taiwan "as a trustee on behalf of
the Allies." 2 5 After WWII ended, the civil war resumed between the
R.O.C. and P.R.C.
After several years of fighting, the P.R.C. defeated the R.O.C. and
established itself as the government of Mainland China on October 1,
1949.26 The R.O.C. immediately moved its governmental headquarters to
Taiwan, hoping to eventually stage a counterattack against the P.R.C. and
regain control of Mainland China.2 7 The R.O.C. fleeing to Taiwan
marked the beginning of the third and current period, when a number of
states created a series of vague agreements and treaties about Taiwan that
compounded the complexity of the Taiwan-China conflict.
C. CurrentPeriod:Development and Changes in the R. O. C. 's
InternationalStatus
After WWII, the status of the R.O.C.'s recognition and international
relationships shifted several times. Although WWII ended in 1945, Japan
did not formally surrender sovereignty over Taiwan until 1952, and it did
system of the Republic of China as a preface to Herbert H. P. Ma's contribution piece entitled,
American Influence on the Formation of the Constitution and ConstitutionalLaw of the Republic
of China: Past History and Future Prospects.).

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

23. Id.; Phil C. W. Chan, The Legal Status of Taiwan and the Legality of the Use of Force

in a Cross-Taiwan StraitConflict, 8 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 455, 463 (2009).
24. Charney & Prescott, supra note 12, at 458.
25. Mikaela L. Ediger, InternationalLaw and the Use of Force against Contested States:

The Case of Taiwan, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1668, 1678 (2018), https://www.nyulawreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/12/NYULawReview-93-6-Ediger.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8XJ-7ZSH].
26. CHEN, supra note 1, at 15.

27. Id.
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so without naming the successor to Taiwan's sovereignty-an issue that
remains unsettled today. 2 8
Between 1943 and 1952, many nations signed declarations and
treaties regarding Taiwan's status, but none of these agreements clearly
settled the issue over Taiwan's proper sovereign. 2 9 In 1943, the U.S.,
United Kingdom (U.K.), and China (at that time governed by the R.O.C.),
gathered in Cairo, Egypt to declare their future intentions for Taiwan after
the end of WWII. 30 In this declaration, later called the Cairo Declaration,
the three nations jointly stated that Taiwan belonged to China prior to
Japan's 1895 seizure, and thus it should return to the R.O.C. at the end of
the war.3 1 In 1945, the same nations signed the Potsdam Declaration,
which simply reiterated the Cairo Declaration's language about Taiwan's
return to R.O.C. rule. 3 2 Neither of these declarations were legally binding
treaties-they were merely statements of present understanding and
future intent.
Following the end of WWII, although the Allied Powers had
"entrusted" the R.O.C. with administering control over Taiwan in 1945,
Japan had not yet formally surrendered control of Taiwan. Japan did not
surrender control of Taiwan until 1952, when Japan and 48 Allied Powers
(not including China or the U.S.S.R.) signed the San Francisco Treaty. 33
In the treaty, Japan renounced "all right, title and claim to Formosa and
the Pescadores." 3 4 The treaty did not settle the Taiwan issue, as neither

28. San Francisco Treaty art. 2, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3170, 136 U.N.T.S. 46 (entered into
force Apr. 23, 1952), https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20136/volume-136-i1832-english.pdf [https://perma.cc/WE52-W9TN]
29.
[T]he non-participation of China in the San Francisco Peace Treaty was, in fact,
a compromise between the United Kingdom, which recognized the PRC
government in 1950 and insisted on China's participation, and the United States,
which changed its declaration of non-intervention in the Taiwan Strait after the
outbreak of the Korean War and proposed that neither the PRC government nor
the authorities on Taiwan be invited to the San Francisco Peace Conference,
which was accepted.
Chan, supra note 23, at 462.
30. Cairo Communique (Final version), Dec. 1, 1943, 9 DEP'T STATE BULL. 393, 3 Bevans

858, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000003-0858.pdf

[https://perma.cc/

QG59-7JB9] (At the time of the Cairo Declaration, the Republic of China was the only
government in China.).

31. Id.
32. Potsdam Declaration, July 26, 1945, 13 DEP'T STATE BULL. 137-38, 3 Bevans 1204,
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000003-1204.pdf [https://perma.cc/57EP-

T2DF].
33. San Francisco Treaty, supra note 28.

34. Id

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2020

7

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 3

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

108

[Vol. 32

the R.O.C. nor the P.R.C. were parties to the treaty, and the treaty was
silent regarding subsequent control over Taiwan.3 5
In October 1971, the U.N. removed the R.O.C. from its membership.
Since 1949, the R.O.C. had exclusive control over Taiwan and only
Taiwan, yet it continued to claim authority over all of China. In 1971, the
U.N. General Assembly confronted the reality that although the R.O.C.
was a founding member of the U.N., it had no realistic claim as the
effective government of Mainland China. The U.N. General Assembly
passed Resolution 2758 to remove the R.O.C. from the U.N. and replace
it with the P.R.C. as the "only lawful representatives of China to the
U.N." 3 6 The resolution also explicitly stated that the P.R.C. holds one of
the five permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council, presumably
replacing the R.O.C.'s previous place on the council. 37 Resolution 2758
did not reference the island of Taiwan or its government, and therefore
failed to provide any clarity regarding the issue of its sovereignty. 3 8
Following the R.O.C.'s removal from the U.N., the R.O.C.'s
relationships with many other states shifted significantly. In 1950,
President Truman announced that Taiwan was rightfully governed by the
R.O.C. 39 However, within six months of that statement, the Korean War
started and President Truman stated the issue should instead be
determined after the U.S. concluded "a peace settlement with Japan."40
By 1954, the U.S. and the R.O.C. entered into a Treaty of Mutual
Defense.41 By the mid-1950s, "territorial status quo had been reached
between the R.O.C. on Taiwan and the P.R.C.," and although the dispute
between the R.O.C. and P.R.C. continues, the same territorial status quo
remains today. 4 2

35. Supra note 29.
36. G.A. Res. 2758 (XXVI), Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People's Republic of
China in the United Nations (Oct. 25, 1971); Sigrid Winkler, Taiwan's UN Dilemma: To Be or
Not To Be, BROOKINGS (June 20, 2012), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/taiwans-undilemma-to-be-or-not-to-be/ [https://perma.cc/8379-NX57] (noting that, "The U.S. voted against

the resolution and the final vote was 76 in favor with 35 against and 17 abstentions.").
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. In a White House press release on January 5, 1950, President Truman stated: "In
keeping with these [Cairo and Potsdam] declarations, Formosa [Taiwan] was surrendered to

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and for the past 4 years, the United States and other Allied
Powers have accepted the exercise of Chinese authority over the island." United States Policy
Towards Formosa, 22 DEP'T STATE BULL. 79 (1950).
40. U.S. Air and Sea Forces Ordered into Supporting Action, 23 DEP'T STATE BULL. 5

(1950).
41. Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of China, China-

U.S., Dec. 2, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 433 (entered into force Mar. 3, 1955).
42. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 200 (2d ed.

2006).
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After U.N. Resolution 2758, the U.S. and P.R.C. jointly issued a series
of executive decrees called "communiques" that expressed the U.S. and
P.R.C. governments' positions on several key issues of the China-Taiwan
dispute. The first communique, later called the "Shanghai Communique,"
was completed in 1972. The U.S. portion of the communique stated that
the U.S. "acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan
Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.
The United States Government does not challenge that position." 43 It also
stated that the U.S. "reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the
Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves."44 The language of the U.S.
position was intentionally vague, but it allowed the U.S. to appease the
P.R.C.
Next, in 1978, the U.S. and the P.R.C. issued another joint
communique. It stated that the U.S. "recognizes the Government of the
People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China," but
that "the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial,
and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan." 4 5 The joint
communique clarified the U.S.' position on Taiwan, stating: "The
Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese
position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China." 46 This
clarification did not state the U.S. agreed with the P.R.C.'s position on
Taiwan, rather it merely acknowledged the P.R.C. position.
On January 1, 1979, after these two communiques established a
clearer understanding of U.S.-P.R.C. policy, the U.S. formally ended its
diplomatic ties with the R.O.C. At the same time, President Carter also
announced that the U.S. would withdraw from the U.S.-Taiwan mutual
defense treaty within one year. 4 7 Strategically, this showed that the U.S.
may have ended its formal relationship with Taiwan, but it still
maintained a sufficient relationship to uphold the mutual defense treaty,
at least for a period of time. The president also removed all U.S. military
personnel from the island by May of 1979.48

43. Joint Communique of the People's Republic of China and the United States
of America, China.-U.S., Feb. 28, 1972, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/doc/
ctc/t36255.htm [https://perma.cc/PX23-KE36] (emphasis added); see also 66 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 431-32 (1966).
44. Id.
45. Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the People's

Republic of China and the United States of America, China-U.S.,
http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/doc/ctc/t36256.htm
(emphasis added); see also 79 DEP'T STATE BULL. 25 (1979).

Dec. 16,

1978,

[https://perma.cc/4VKB-CXPL]

46. Id. (emphasis added).
47. LAWRENCE & MORRISON, supra note 9, at 23.

48. Id.
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In April 1979, the U.S. passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA),
which, along with the joint communiques, continues to serve as the
foundation of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. 4 9 The TRA states that any
efforts "to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means"
will be considered "a threat to the peace and security of the Western
Pacific." 5 0 The TRA also states that the U.S. will maintain the capacity
to "resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would
jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people
on Taiwan." 51 The most important statement regarding the defense of
Taiwan is ambiguous, however, because it does not state whether the U.S.
will defend Taiwan if attacked. Specifically, the TRA only states that the
U.S. "will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense
services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to
maintain a sufficient self-defense capability." 5 2 Furthermore, the TRA
states that in the event that a threat is posed to Taiwan, "The President
and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional
processes, appropriate action by the U.S. in response to any such
danger." 53
The TRA also clarifies how U.S. domestic law will treat Taiwan. It
states that "the absence of diplomatic relations or recognition shall not
affect the application of the laws of the [U.S.] with respect to Taiwan" as
they applied before the U.S. ended its formal relationship with Taiwan. 54
It also says that U.S. laws that refer or relate to foreign "countries,
nations, states, governments, or similar entities" shall apply to Taiwan.5 5
The U.S. issued its final communique in 1982, which added additional
details about the U.S. sale of arms to Taiwan. 56 Clarity was needed
because the TRA's ambiguity about the provision of self-defense articles
and services. In this final communique, the U.S. expressed a desire for a
peaceful resolution, but clearly expressed the U.S.' intention to continue

49. Taiwan Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-8,
at 22 U.S.C. § 3301).
50. Id. § 2(b)(4).
51. Id. § 2(b)(6).
52. Id. § 3(a).
53. Id. § 3(c).
54. 22 U.S.C. § 3303(a) (2020).
55. Id.

§

§ 1, 93 Stat. 14 (1979) (codified as amended

3303(b); Taiwan is treated as a State for the purposes of severing immunity and

the act of state doctrine under U.S. law. See Millen Indus. Inc. v. Coordination Council for N.
Am. Affairs, 855 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
56. Joint Communiqud of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America,
Aug.

17, 1982, China-U.S., http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/doc/ctc/t946

664.html

[https://perma.cc/A6PC-33NA] [hereinafter 1982 Communiqud].
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to sell arms to the R.O.C. It explained how the U.S. would limit and
eventually cease arm sales, but no deadline was stated. 57
The R.O.C. eventually ceased its claim to Mainland China in 1987.
Every year from 1993 to 2007, it requested membership in the U.N.5 8
Each of these attempts failed due to the U.N.'s recognition of the P.R.C.
as the government of China, and also the U.N.'s recognition of a "one
China" policy. 59 As of 2016, Taiwan has ninety-four unofficial
representative offices in fifty-eight countries, and it hosts sixty-nine
embassies and embassy-like offices from countries around the world. 60 It
has formal relationships with fourteen countries, but that number is
dwindling quickly. 61 Since 2016, seven states have cut diplomatic ties
with Taiwan and opened formal ties with the P.R.C. 62
The U.S. government's position regarding Taiwan remains unclear.
Politicians and scholars have characterized the U.S. policy as "strategic
ambiguity," because of the purposeful intent to avoid a final resolution to
the dispute. 63
In summary, not a single agreement, declaration, or treaty produced
by the international community settled the question of Taiwan's rightful
sovereign. Nor does the centuries-long history of China and Taiwan
provide a clear answer. Because of this lack of clarity, the dispute remains
mired in ambiguity. To resolve this ambiguity and answer the question of
whether the U.S. or other states may defend Taiwan from a P.R.C. armed
attack, we turn to international law.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING THE TAIWAN-CHINA CONFLICT

Modern international law is founded on the principle of Westphalian
sovereignty that originated in the 1600s. 4 Westphalian sovereignty is
based on two related principles: first, that sovereign states have absolute
57. The communique stated that the U.S. "does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of
arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in
quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic
relations between the United States and China, and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of
arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution." 1982 Communique, supra
note 56; See also, 82 DEPT. STATE BULL. 19-20 (1950).
58. LAWRENCE & MORRISON, supra note 9, at 57.

59. UN Rejects

Taiwan Application for Entry, N.Y.

TIMES (July

24, 2007),

https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/24/world/asia/24iht-taiwan. 1.6799766.html [https://perma cc

/2H2J-LDGX].
60. LAWRENCE & MORRISON, supra note 9, at 54.
61. Embassies & Missions, supra note 8.
62. Kate Lyons, Taiwan Loses Second Ally in a Week as Kiribati Switches to China,
GUARDIAN, Sept. 20, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/20/taiwan-losessecond-ally-in-a-week-as-kiribati-switches-to-china [https://perma.cc/NVR6-CLHQ].
63. U.S. Relations With Taiwan, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (2018), https://www.state.gov/u-s-

relations-with-taiwan/ [https://perma.cc/U9SY-AE96] (last visited Apr. 15, 2020).
64. Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 20, 26 (1948).
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power over their own state, and second, that international law only
regulates relations between states, and not within a state's domestic
authority. 65 These two principles serve as the foundation for the U.N.
Charter. 66
Thus, because Taiwan's status as a sovereign state is contested, the
U.N. Charter does not create a legal paradigm that resolves the conflict
between Taiwan and China. Although the U.N. Charter does not directly
answer these questions, post-WWII treaties and state practice show that
the rights and obligations normally afforded only to sovereign states also
apply to contested states. This section discusses the treaty and customary
law relevant to the Taiwan-China conflict including: state recognition,
self-determination, the prohibition on the use of force, and self-defense.
A. State Recognition
The rights and obligations of an international entity depend
significantly on whether it is recognized as a state. This matter is
complicated because the law of state recognition is broadly defined.
There is no international organization with the authority to grant
statehood, so reviewing state practice is the best way to determine an
entity's status. Modern state practice suggests statehood exists as a matter
of both internal and external factors: internal being the factual qualities
of a state, and external being how a state interacts with other states. 67 As
such, membership in the U.N. is a strong indication of external
recognition, which is unlikely to be achieved unless other states believe
that an entity has fulfilled the internal qualities of statehood. Nevertheless
U.N. membership is not necessary for statehood.
The most widely accepted definition for statehood comes from the
1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Dutids of States. The
Montevideo Convention requires that a state must hold the following four
criteria: (1) a permanent population; (2) a defined territory; (3) a
government; and (4) the capacity to enter into international relations. 68
While these criteria are recognized as customary evidence of statehood,
they are only necessary and not sufficient on their own for statehood. For
example, Hong Kong meets the Montevideo criteria, but it clearly is not
65. Id. at 28-29.
66. "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall
require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this
principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII." U.N.
Charter art. 2, ¶ 7.

67.

CRAwFORD,

supra note 42, at 4-5.

68. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, T.S.

No. 881, O.A.S.T.S. No. 37 (entered into force Dec. 26, 1934) [hereinafter Montevideo
Convention].
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a sovereign state. Hong Kong shows that the Montevideo definition is
incomplete, as meeting the Montevideo criteria alone does not grant
statehood.
Following the 1933 Montevideo Convention, international law
scholars developed two competing theories of state recognition: the
"declaratory" and the "constitutive" theories. 69 The declaratory theory
simply claims that statehood is achieved if a state meets all the
Montevideo criteria.70 This theory aligns with the Montevideo
Convention itself, which says: "[t]he political existence of the state is
independent of recognition by the other states." 71 The declaratory theory
suggests that gaining recognition by other states simply bolsters the fact
that the sovereign state already exists. Some scholars prefer the
declaratory theory over the constitutive theory because "[r]ecognition, as
an act of state, is an optional and political act and there is no legal duty
in this regard.... [I]f an entity bears the marks of statehood other states
put themselves at risk legally, if they ignore the basic obligations of state
relations." 72 Furthermore, a state that is unrecognized by some cannot
simply be exempt from international law. Once a state meets the
Montevideo requirements, and holds itself out as a state, it should receive
the benefits and comply with the obligations of a state.
- Although some scholars prefer it, the declaratory theory has its
weaknesses. Suppose "State B" is widely understood to meet all the
Montevideo criteria, yet fails to obtain state recognition from any other
state. Accordingly, State B cannot realistically claim to be an
international person, because, while it can enter into international
relations with other states, it does not actually maintain any international
relationships.
The second competing theory is the constitutive theory. This theory
says an entity is only a state if it meets the Montevideo criteria and is
recognized by other states.73 Crawford, an international expert in the law
of statehood, explained the constitutive theory as follows:
[I]n every legal system some organ must be competent to
determine with certainty the subjects of the system. In the
present international system that can only be done by the
States, acting individually or collectively. Since [states] act

69.

CRAWFORD, supra note 42, at 4.
70. Id.; See also Ediger, supra note 25, at 1679-80. However, this theory is flawed because
it ignores the "reality that the creation of states is a legal status attached to a state by virtue of
certain rules or practices by other states." as pointed out by Crawford. CRAWFORD, supra note 42;

at 4-5.
71. Montevideo Convention, supra note 68, art. 3.
72.

IAN

BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 89-90

(7th

ed.

2008).

73. Ediger, supra note 25, at 1679-80; See also CRAWFORD, supra note 42, at 4.
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in the matter as organs in the system, their determinations
must have definitive legal effect. 74
Oppenheim, a renowned expert in public international law, argued that
the constitutive theory is the only acceptable method of state recognition
by stating: "A state is and becomes an International Person (sic) through
recognition only and exclusively." 75
The constitutive theory also has its weaknesses. It provides no clear
standard by which nations can be recognized in the international
community. Because the theory does not specify the number of states
required for recognition, it can create impossible results. For example, if
"State A" gains recognition from only a few other states, State A cannot
simultaneously hold statehood (because of the states that recognize it)
and lack statehood (because of the states that do not recognize it). When
viewed in this light, the theory simply emphasizes the fact that states
without wide recognition likely lack essential characteristics of
recognized states. 76 It may be argued, however, that statehood cannot be
realized unless a state gains unanimous recognition around the world.
Modern practice regarding state recognition reveals both internal and
external elements that appear to balance the declarative and constitutive
theories. That balance often reflects a highly fact-specific analysis that
cannot be clearly summarized in a single theory. 77 In many cases,
however, state recognition is often simply just a political decision.
Another scholar summarized the political reality of this balance by stating
that "the rules of state recognition, although legal rules, are legal vehicles
for political choices."78
B. Self-Determination
Self-determination is an emerging principle in international law that
provides some state-like rights to unique groups of people that lack
statehood. Prior to WWII, there was no established law regarding the law
74. CRAWFORD, supra note 42, at 20. Crawford acknowledges that this analogy does not
apply perfectly to international law, however, because international law involves "'difficult
circumstances of fact and law,' but it has never been suggested that the views of particular states
are 'constitutive."' Id.

75. Lee, supra note 2, at 382 (quoting Oppenheim). Oppenheim's opinion must be taken in
context, however, because his writings focused on a Western/Christian centric notion of the "Law
of Nations." States became subject to the "Law of Nations" only by the "common consent of
Christian nations." Without recognition by previous members of the "society of nations," express
or implied, no state was considered an "international person." See CRAWFORD, supra note 42, at

14-15.
76. This argument is circular, as the lack of wide recognition shows an entity is not a state,
but that same lack of recognition is the very reason why other states will not recognize that entity.
77. CRAWFORD, supra note 42, at 4-5.
78. William Thomas Worster, Law, Politics, and the Conception of the State in State

Recognition Theory, 27 B.U. INT'L L. J. 115, 115-16 (2009).
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of self-determination, but the principle already began to emerge. In 1920,
an international commission of jurists created a report on the Aaland
Islands, which is now an autonomous region of Finland in the Baltic Sea.
The report stated that peoples have the right to internal selfdetermination, or the right of self-governance within their own state. But
the report limited the right of external self-determination (or the right to
independence) by stating: "Positive International Law does not recognize
the right of [peoples] to separate themselves from the State of which they
form part by the simple expression of a wish...."79
Following WWII, the U.N. Charter and other covenants codified the
trend in international law to give a right of self-determination for distinct
"peoples." Article 1(2) of the U.N. Charter states that one of the purposes
of the Charter is to "develop friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples ... "8 0 Within two decades, in 1966, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) declared the right to
self-determination. 8 1 These two Covenants share a common Article 1,
which states: "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue
of this right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development." 82 These burgeoning
expressions of the right to self-determination were limited, though, to
distinct groups of "peoples," which have proven difficult to define.
Defining "peoples" is difficult because some states may wish to
prevent groups from receiving the designation of "peoples." This is
because states may consider the rights of "peoples" as an infringement on
state sovereignty. Additional factors that make defining "peoples"
difficult are the unique distinctions in the history, culture, identities, and
geographic locations of peoples around the world. Accordingly, no single
definition can indisputably allow populations who claim the status of a
"people" to actually receive the rights of "peoples."
Despite this, in 1960 the U.N. General Assembly provided a general
definition of "peoples" in Principle IV of Resolution 1541. It stated that
peoples are found in "a territory which is geographically separate and is
distinct ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering it." 83

79. International Commission of Jurists, The Aaland Islands Question: Report of the
Committee of Jurists, 3 LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J. SPEC. SUPP. 5 (1920),
https://www.ilsa-org/Jessup/Jessupl0/basicmats/aaland l.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ERJ-3FG3].

80. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2.
81. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, ¶ 1, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 173 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural

Rights art. 1,

¶ 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 1 [hereinafter ICESCR].

82. See sources cited supra note 81.

83. G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), annex, Principle IV (Dec. 15, 1960).
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While the definition of "peoples" and the accompanying rights to selfdetermination seem generous, they are not unlimited.
In 1970, the U.N. General Assembly adopted, by consensus, the
Declaration on Friendly Relations (DFR). The DFR explained some of
the limitations of the right of self-determination. It stated, "[e]very State
has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives
peoples ... of their right to self-determination and freedom and
independence." 84 But the DFR also stated that the right to selfdetermination does not infringe on the principles of sovereignty,
territorial integrity, and non-intervention. 85
Additional limits to the right of self-determination are found in
customary law. Crawford used thirty examples of attempted unilateral
secession in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, to argue that
"outside the colonial context, the principle of self-determination is not
recognized in practice as giving rise to unilateral rights of secession by
parts of independent States." 86 The Canadian Supreme Court expounded
on the limits of secession rights in its opinion regarding Quebec's desire
to secede from Canada in the mid-1990s. The court stated, "'[A] people"'
may have a right to secede if they are "denied any meaningful exercise of
its right to self-determination."87
Despite the Canadian Supreme Court opinion, international law does
not necessarily grant the right of secession, or external selfdetermination, to "peoples" who are denied the right to selfdetermination. Crawford cast doubt on this right when he explained that
even when humanitarian problems have "triggered widespread concern,"
if "the government of the State in question has maintained its opposition
to the unilateral secession, such attempts have gained virtually no
international support or recognition." 8 8 Additionally, amid the diverse
and alarming humanitarian crises seen since the creation of the U.N. in
1945, "[N]o State which has been created by unilateral secession has been
admitted to the United Nations against the declared wishes of the

84. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United

Nations (Oct. 24, 1970).
85. Id. ("Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorising (sic) or
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial

integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described....")
86. James Crawford, State Practice and InternationalLaw in Relation to Secession, 69
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 85, 113 (1998).
87. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 154 (Can.) [hereinafter
Secession of Quebec].
88. Crawford, supra note 86, at 115-16.
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government of the predecessor State." 89 In all circumstances, consent of
the original state has accompanied successful secessions. This includes,
for example, the separation or dissolution of Yugoslavia and the breakup
of the Soviet Union.9 0 Thus, the practice of states has clearly developed
to show that "peoples" have the right to internal self-determination, or
self-governance, but not to external self-determination unless in the
context of colonial domination.
In conclusion, in the context of international disputes and contested
states, self-determination plays a limited, but significant, role. The right
to self-determination becomes relevant to contested states if the original
state accepts the claim of the "peoples" within the contested state. After
recognition, although the "people" are unlikely to gain the right to
secession, they gain rights that give them quasi-sovereignty over certain
aspects of their territory, all within the territorial sovereignty of their
original state.
C. The Prohibitionon the Use of Force
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter codifies the prohibition on the use of
force between states, which is considered ajus cogens norm of customary
international law. 9 1 Article 2(4) states: "[a]ll Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."92 This
section explains how Article 2(4) applies to contested states.
The language of Article 2(4) focuses its prohibition on the use of force
to actions that constitute "international relations." 93 This focus is tied to
the Westphalian principle that sovereign states have absolute power
within their borders. Historically, many U.N. member states have
supported the principle of absolute sovereignty by confirming the right
for states to quell unilateral attempts at secession. For example, when
Chechnya declared independence from Russia in 1991, although many
89. Id. at 92; see id. at 103 ("[T]he right to self-determination must not involve changes to
existing frontiers at the time of independence (uti possidetis juris) except where the States
concerned agree otherwise.").
90. Crawford, supra note 86, at 93-105. Crawford explains that in the aftermath of the fall
of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation was recognized by the eleven constituent republics
born out of the breakup of the former Soviet Union and the United Nations as the
"continuing. . . legal personality" of the former Soviet Union. Id. at 93, 98. Thus, as the
"continuing...legal personality" of the former Soviet Union, it was the Russian Federation that,
"accepted the emergence to independence of the other republics and supported their applications

for United Nations membership." Id.
91. Oscar Schachter,'The Legality ofPro-DemocraticInvasion, 78 AM. J.

INT'L

L. 645, 648

(1984) (explaining how non-intervention has increasingly been referred to as a jus cogens norm).

92. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
93. Id.
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states condemned the disproportionate use of force and specific violations
of international human rights law, France, the U.K., and the.U.S., among
others, supported Russia's use of force to protect its territorial integrity.94
While the U.S. supported Russia's use of force to defend its territory, the
U.S. stated that Russia should limit its "use of force to a minimum and
respect human rights." 95
Although the Article 2(4) prohibition seems only to address U.N.
Member states using force against other states, the prohibition can also
apply to contested states. Article 2(4) can apply to internal relations
because it prohibits use of force that is inconsistent with the "purposes of
the United Nations." 96 Article 1(1) of the U.N. Charter says that one of
the purposes of the United Nations is "to maintain international peace and
security... and to bring about by peaceful means... [the] settlement of
international disputes or situations that might lead to a breach of the
peace." 9 7 Thus, the U.N. Charter protects contested states from the use of
force if it would breach international peace and security. 98
In practice, however, applying Article 2(4) to contested states is more
difficult and limited than it may seem. Applying Article 2(4) to contested
states is difficult because there is no clear definition of a "breach of
international security," so there is no clear threshold for the Article's
application. As demonstrated by the Chechnya example above, an
original state can use force against a contested state without breaching
international peace or security. Oppositely, if members of the
international community do not respect the original state's claim of
sovereignty over a contested state, then a use of force against the
contested state would inherently be an international issue, and therefore
rise to a violation of international law. Other states may argue that, even
if they respect the original state's claim, an original state's use of force
over a territory dispute can have a detrimental impact beyond the borders
of both the original and contested state and therefore threaten
"international peace and security."
Lastly, Article 2(4) is not an absolute prohibition on the use of force,
because the U.N. Charter provides two other justifications for the use of
force. Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter explains the procedures required to
gain U.N. authorization to use force, which ultimately requires
authorization from the U.N. Security Council. 99 The last exception to
94. Crawford, supra note 86, at 111-12.

95. Id. at 112.
96. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
97. U.N. Charter art.

1, 1 1; see also U.N.

Charter art. 33.

98. Many scholars agree that it is "almost generally accepted that de facto regimes
exercising their authority in a stabilized manner are also bound and protected by Art 2(4)."
Albrecht Randelzhofer & Oliver D6rr, Article 2(4), in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, A
COMMENTARY 200, ¶¶ 29, 32 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012).

99. U.N. Charter art. 39.
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Article 2(4) is found in Article 51 of Chapter 7, which explains the
inherent right to self-defense.1 00
D. Self-Defense
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter describes the right to self-defense and
provides balance to the prohibition on the use of force found in Article
2(4) of the Charter. 101 Article 2(4) has customary roots dating back to the
Middle Ages, but Article 51 is founded, at least in part, upon Roman
principles that predate even the earliest western notions of just war
theory.10 2 This norm cemented itself through the centuries because, as
Hugo Grotius argued, the "right [of self-defense] is so tied to the instinct
of self-preservation that it must transcend simple customary international
norms." 103 Also, as Westphalian sovereignty developed, it became clear
that sovereignty wholly depended upon a state's right "to preserve its
very existence." 104 Because of its fundamental nature, the principle of
self-defense is a peremptory, or ajus cogens, norm.
For members of the U.N., the right of individual and collective selfdefense is clear. The U.N. Charter enshrines the customary law on selfdefense as follows: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence (sic) if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security." 10 5 This provision clarifies that individual and collective selfdefense is an inherent right that Member states can exercise without U.N.
approval. It is debated, however, whether the Security Council can limit
a state's customary right to self-defense. Regarding collective selfdefense, the ICJ's Nicaragua case clarified its customary
requirements. 106 The ICJ clarified that the requirements for a third-party
state to lawfully intervene on behalf of any other state be that a state must
first declare itself a victim of an armed attack and then make an explicit
request for defense.1 0 7
100. U.N. Charter art. 51.
101. Id.
102. M. A. Weightman, Self-Defense in InternationalLaw, 37 VA. L. REV. 1095 (1951); see
also Ziyad Motala & David T. ButleRitchie, Self-Defense in International Law, the United
Nations, and the Bosnian Conflict, 57 UNIV. Prr. L. REV. 1, 9 (1995).
103. Motala & ButleRitchie, supra note 102, at 12.
104. Id. at 14.
105. U.N. Charter art. 51. The French version of the U.N. Charter characterizes the right as
"droit naturel," or as a "natural right." Id. (French Version).
106. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United

States), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 199-200 (June 27,
cij.org/public/files/case-related/70/070-19860627-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf

1986), https://www.icj[https:/perma.cc/DY54-

G9JN] [hereinafter Nicaragua Case].

107. Id.¶ 232.
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Article 51 discusses only the right of U.N. Member states, making no
reference to the rights of non-members. Though the Charter does not
reference non-member rights, the language of Article 51 strongly
suggests that the "right to self-defense is an inherent right irrespective of
membership of the United Nations...."108 But the right to individual and
collective self-defense for contested states is not settled.
Westphalian sovereignty maintains that the right to self-defense is
reserved only for recognized states, but some experts suggest that
contested states can also hold the right to self-defense. The Council of the
European Union addressed the self-defense rights of contested states in
its report: Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the
Conflict in Georgia.10 9 The report stated that customary international law
suggests contested states have the right to individual self-defense, but the
Council stated that "individual self-defense and collective self-defense
are not logically linked," therefore, it would not be "inconsistent to allow
an entity short of statehood to defend itself against armed attack, while at
the same time limiting its right to 'invite' foreign support."" 0 The
European Council further stated that the "right to 'invite' foreign
support... would not de-escalate, but escalate the conflict and therefore
run counter to the objectives of the United Nations.""' The principle of
non-intervention may support the Council's finding, but intervention may
only become an issue if the "invited" nation does not recognize the
statehood of the contested state.
Other scholars argue that international law does permit collective selfdefense of contested states. Henderson argues, however, that allowing a
contested state to defend itself but denying it collective self-defense is
"illogical" because contested states are generally small and unable to
defend themselves, rendering individual self-defense meaningless." 2 But
international state practice shows few examples of states proclaiming the
exercise of Article 51 collective self-defense of contested states. One
example of collective self-defense of a contested state is the U.S.'
involvement in the Vietnam War.

108. Chan, supra note 23, at 482; see also U.N. Charter art. 51.
109. Christian Henderson, Contested States and the Rights and Obligations of the Jus Ad
Bellum, 21 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 367, 404 (2013).
110. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, volume 11,

282

at

(Sept.

30,

2009),

https://www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/IIFFMCG_Volume_Ill.pdf

[https://perma.cc/CC38-NSFB] [hereinafter IIFFMCG]; see also Henderson, supra note 109, at

404.
111. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflift in Georgia, supra note

110, at 282.
112. Henderson, supra note 109, at 404. Henderson also acknowledges that this area of the
law is unsettled and granting collective self-defense to all contested state could create harm
international peace and security. Id. at 407.
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The U.S. entered the Vietnam War to help defend South Vietnam, a
part of the former state of Vietnam that had split into two parts. In 1954,
prior to engaging in the Vietnam War, the U.S. signed the Asia Collective
Defense Treaty, along with France and other states. After the Gulf of
Tonkin incident, the U.S. Congress "adopted a resolution stating it was
prepared to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to
assist any member [of the treaty] requesting assistance in defense of its
freedom."" 3 The U.S.' justifications for entering the conflict included:
(1) North Vietnam committed an armed attack against South Vietnam;
(2) South Vietnam was recognized as a separate international entity by
approximately 60 states; and (3) South Vietnam requested U.S.
assistance.11 4 The U.S. said it could help defend South Vietnam based off
either the 1954 treaty or the invitation of South Vietnam, but this position
faced opposition by international law scholars." 5
To conclude, the law is unsettled regarding the rights of contested
states to individual or collective self-defense. Because international law
is inherently permissive in nature, third-party states may lawfully provide
collective self-defense for states that they recognize, because doing so is
not specifically prohibited under the law. However, prior to a third-party
state exercising collective self-defense on behalf of a contested state that
is a victim of an armed attack, the third-party state must formally
acknowledge the statehood of the victim state, lest it violate the territorial
integrity of the attacking state.
To the international community, however, the collective or individual
opinions of particular states can influence the world's perception about
the lawfulness of certain actions. The perceived lawfulness regarding a
third-party state defending a contested state will hinge on the number of
states that formally recognize the contested state. The more states that
recognize a contested state, the more likely the international community
will determine that it is lawful to defend the contested state.
At this point, this Article has explained the international law regarding
state recognition, self-determination, and how the prohibition on the use
of force and self-defense impact contested states. These principles
provide an analytical foundation for the conflict between China and
Taiwan because they show that the rights and obligations of states are not
limited to formally recognized states. Nevertheless, the unsettled nature
113.

STANIMIR ALEXANDROV, SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL

LAw 221 (1996).

114. Id.
115. A group of international lawyers opposed the U.S. position, arguing that South Vietnam
was not a recognized state and therefore did not have a right to collective self-defense. They stated
that the North did not commit an armed attack because the North's efforts amounted to civil strife.
These efforts included a slow stream of infiltrators over the course of a 10-year period. Lastly,
they argued that the South Vietnamese government was as client government of the U.S. so their
request for assistance could not be considered legitimate. Id.
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of the law of state recognition prevents contested states from fitting into
the traditional paradigm of Westphalian sovereignty, and the jus cogens
norms regarding the non-use of force and self-defense. Having explained
the law, the next section of this Article will apply the aforementioned
laws and principles to the conflict between China and Taiwan.
III.

AN ANALYSIS OF

TAIWAN'S STATUS IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW

Taiwan's internal and external characteristics demonstrate that it
exercises the factual and legal qualities of a state. The analysis following
will explain Taiwan's status in international law by examining whether it
is a recognized state and whether it has a "people" that qualify for selfdetermination. Next, it will analyze how the prohibition on the use of
force and self-defense apply to Taiwan. Ultimately, it describes that the
U.S. and other nations may lawfully defend Taiwan provided that they
first formally recognize its statehood.
A. Taiwan's State Recognition
Taiwan holds all the essential characteristics of a state, but, by most
accounts, Taiwan is still not a recognized state. It maintains formal stateto-state relationships with 14 states,' 1 6 and "unofficial" non-diplomatic
relationships with 57 other states, including the U.S., Japan, the U.K.,
Germany, and essentially every other major world power except
Russia." 7 The fact that Taiwan lacks widespread formal state recognition
shows the inherent weakness in international law's concept of state
recognition.
State recognition is determined by a combination of internal and
external factors, as described by the constitutive and declarative theories
of state recognition, but neither of these theories balance the political
reality found in state practice. Accordingly, this section will analyze
Taiwan's status under both the declarative and constitutive theories of
state recognition and will ultimately demonstrate that Taiwan clearly
meets the declarative theory and partly meets the constitutive theory.
Taiwan's relationships show that it experiences widespread de facto
recognition, which in some respects can constitute de jure recognition
because of the highly political influence the P.R.C. exercises on Taiwan's
state recognition.

116. Tom O'Connor, Which Countries Still Recognize Taiwan? Two More Nations Switch
to China in Less than a Week, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.newsweek.com/whorecognizes-taiwan-two-change-china-1460559 [https://perma.cc/4Z4L-T8WY].
117. EMBASSIES & MISSIONS, supra note 8.
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1. Declarative Theory
Under the declarative theory, Taiwan is a state because international
legal scholars largely agree that Taiwan meets all four of the Montevideo
factors. 1 8 First, Taiwan has a permanent population. Since 1949, when a
massive flood of members of the R.O.C. government fled Mainland
China to Taiwan, Taiwan's population has been stable and permanent.
Taiwan currently has a permanent, stable population of about 25
million.' 19 Taiwan controls its borders, issues its people passports and
visas, and controls immigration.1 2 0
Second, the territory of Taiwan is clearly defined, and its borders have
not been disputed since conflicts over outlying islands of Taiwan in the
early 1950s. The P.R.C. government does not dispute the boundaries of
Taiwan, only the rightful sovereign over the territory.121
Third, Taiwan has an effective government that exercises control over
the territory to the clear exclusion of any other government. The R.O.C.
government of Taiwan has controlled the territory exclusively since 1949,
exercising martial law from 1949 until 1987, and then slowly
democratizing until the first open democratic elections were completed
in 1996.122 Taiwan exercises full control over its military, economy,
immigration, law enforcement, international relations, and every other
facet of government. No other government claims to exercise any control
over Taiwan's people or territory. Crawford states: "It is true that Taiwan
is hardly a renegade province of the P.R.C. The R.O.C. was not part of
and was never in fact brought within the governmental system of the
P.R.C."123

Fourth, and lastly, Taiwan has the capacity to enter into relations with
other nations. As discussed above, Taiwan not only has the capacity to
enter into relations with other nations, but it in fact also has relationships
with 71 other nations, either formal or informal.1 24
Under the declarative theory, Taiwan unambiguously meets all the
criteria for state recognition under the Montevideo Convention and
should be a recognized state. Recognition by other states is irrelevant
under this theory, as the Montevideo Convention itself says, "[t]he

118. Chan, supranote 23, at 465 ("Taiwan indeed satisfies all these criteria for statehood.").
Even Chan, an opponent to Taiwan's statehood, agrees that Taiwan satisfies these criteria.
119. Ediger supra note 25, at 1680.

120. NATIONAL
IMMIGRATION
AGENCY,
https://www.immigration.gov.tw/5475/
[https://perma.cc/Q6TQ-EQNZ] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021); VISA, PASSPORTS, AND
AUTHENTICATION, https://taiwan.gov.tw/content3.php?p=33&c=52 (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
121. Jianming Shen, Sovereignty, Statehood, Self-Determination, and the Issue of Taiwan,

15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1101, 1129 (2000).
122. Chan, supra note 23, at 464, 479 n.136.
123. CRAWFORD, supra note 42, at 216.
124. O'Connor, supra note 116; EMBASSIES & MISSIONS, supra note 8.
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political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other
states."12 5
Despite Taiwan's clear satisfaction of the Montevideo requirements,
some scholars suggest the declaratory theory also requires a formal
declaration of independence. Crawford, while admitting that Taiwan
meets all the Montevideo requirements, states: "Taiwan is not a state
because it still has not unequivocally asserted its separation from China
and is not recognized as a state distinct from China." 26 Crawford's view
is that "claims to statehood are not to be inferred from statements or
actions short of explicit declaration."1 2 7 However, Crawford's position is
too narrowly defined and is not supported by practical reality.
Taiwan has not formally declared its independence from the P.R.C. in
a single, stand-alone declaratory event, but it has effectively declared its
independence many times. In response to the P.R.C.'s Anti-Secession
Law of 2005, Taiwan issued a formal response stating: "based on the
Montevideo convention of 1933, it is undeniable that the R.O.C. is a
sovereign and independent state." 1 28 Also, every year from 1993 to 2007,
Taiwan requested membership in the U.N., an organization to which only
states may belong. 129 Following its last rejection from the U.N. in 2007,
Taiwan's president sent a letter to the U.N. stating: "Taiwan is an
independent sovereign nation."130 Despite a few opposing opinions,
Taiwan is widely recognized to qualify as a state under the declarative
theory of state recognition.
2. Constitutive Theory
On the other hand, very few scholars suggest that Taiwan satisfies the
definition of statehood under the constitutive theory. While the
constitutive theory does not present a specific number of states that must
recognize another state for it to gain "recognition," it seems that 14 out
of nearly 200 nations is not enough, and the number of states that
recognize Taiwan is dwindling. No large nations have formal ties with
Taiwan, and of the 14 states that still recognize it, most of them are small
island nations with little to no international influence. For example, of the
G20 member states, which represent ninety percent of global GDP, not a
single member has formal ties with Taiwan; however, 18 of the 20
maintain non-diplomatic unofficial relations with Taiwan (excluding
125. Montevideo Convention, supra note 68, art. 3.
126. CRAWFORD, supra note 42, at 219.

127. CRAWFORD, supra note 42, at 211.
128. Anti-Secession Law, infra note 134; CRAWFORD, supra note 42, at 218
129. LAWRENCE & MORRISON, supra note 9, at 57.
130. Yael Ronen, Entitiesthat Can Be States But Do Not Claim to Be, STATEHOOD AND SELFDETERMINATION: RECONCILING TRADITION AND MODERNITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 23, 49 n.106
(Duncan French ed., 2015), https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/2733.
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only the P.R.C. and the European Union).1 3 1 With such limited official
recognition in the international community, Taiwan fails to clearly
demonstrate recognition under the current definition of the constitutive
theory.
As previously discussed, the U.N. rejected Taiwan's membership
application at least 15 times. Although the U.N. has no official authority
to determine state recognition, acceptance into the U.N. may be the
clearest benchmark for state recognition under the constitutive theory.
Due to the narrow framework provided by international law, Taiwan does
not fit into the current paradigm of the constitutive theory of state
recognition in general. The reality of Taiwan's unique "state" practice
should hold significant weight in international law, and it should be given
its proper weight when analyzing Taiwan's recognition under the
constitutive theory.1 3 2

Regarding formal recognition, it is unlikely Taiwan will ever obtain
membership into the U.N. In the U.N., state recognition must be
recommended by the U.N. Security Council and voted on by the U.N.
General Assembly.' 3 3 Even if Taiwan's application to the U.N. is
accepted, the P.R.C., with its permanent seat on the Security Council, will
invariably veto any effort by Taiwan to gain U.N. recognition. This is
also demonstrated by the P.R.C.'s Anti-Secession Law and consistent
rhetoric from P.R.C. leadership.1 3 4 In reality, Taiwan's repeated
applications from 1993 to 2007 were rejected by the U.N. and never even
formally considered.13 5
While the previous section demonstrates that Taiwan may never
obtain U.N. membership, it can still become a state under the constitutive
theory by gaining recognition from a significant number of states. In fact,
the official position of several states already implies Taiwan's official
state recognition. The following section will provide a brief overview of
most states' official position regarding Taiwan's sovereignty. It will then
review certain aspects of Canada, the U.K., Japan, and the U.S.'
relationship with Taiwan, with emphasis on the U.S.' relationship. The
section will conclude by discussing why the U.S. and other world powers'

131.

WHAT IS THE G20, https://www.g20foundation.org/g20/what-is-the-g20 [https://perma

.cc/3BRC-TXSY] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
132. Charney & Prescott, supra note 12, at 453 (arguing that no conclusive answer is possible
on the question of whether Taiwan rightfully belongs to the R.O.C. or P.R.C.).
133. ABOUT UN MEMBERSHIP, https://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/about-unmembership/index.html [https://perma.cc/PK9Z-4XFF] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
134. Anti-Secession Law, EMBASSY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE UNITED
STATES (adopted by the Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 14, 2005), http://www.china-embassy.org/

eng/zt/999999999/t187406.htm [https://perma.cc/UXU6-NVCV]

[hereinafter Anti-Secession

Law].
135. Winkler, supra note 36.
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defacto recognition of Taiwan should in some respects equate to de jure
recognition.
Starting in 1970, the P.R.C. started gaining formal recognition from
nations around the world; this was in response to the P.R.C.'s rise to
power in the international community. When the P.R.C. established
diplomatic relations with foreign states, it demanded that states recognize
it as the "sole legitimate government of China" and also recognize its
claim of sovereignty over Taiwan.1 3 6 The P.R.C. published "joint
communiques" with each nation with which it established a formal
relationship. 137 Between 1970 and 1996, 123 nations established formal
relations with the P.R.C.1 38 Of the 123 joint communiques established,
only Russia expressed affirmative support for the P.R.C.'s position
regarding Taiwan.1 3 9 The other states' communiques expressed various
responses to the P.R.C.'s claim of sovereignty over Taiwan. Thirty-three
states, mostly former U.S.S.R. states and third world countries, stated that
they "recognize" the P.R.C. position on Taiwan; nine states, including the
U.S. and most British Commonwealth countries, "acknowledge" it; and
twenty states, including Japan, South Korea, and the Netherlands, used
non-committal language like "take note of' or "respect" it. 140 Sixty states'
communiques were silent regarding Taiwan. 14 1 This shows that the
official position of nearly every world power remains ambiguous
regarding Taiwan's status. In practice, however, these states' actual
relationships are more indicative of Taiwan's position in international
law.
Nearly all world powers have strong ties with Taiwan. Certain aspects
of Canada, the United Kingdom (U.K.), and Japan's relationships with
Taiwan show how it is actually treated like a fully recognized state. In
Canada's case, negotiations over the P.R.C. joint communique stalled
because of the Canadian government's belief that "it would be improper
and inconsistent with international practices to recognize the P.R.C.'s
sovereignty over Taiwan."1 42 Canada maintains a de facto embassy in
Taipei called the "Canadian Trade Office in Taipei," and it also shares a

136. Lee, supra note 2, at 357.

137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 359; See generally
https://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/

WEST ASIA

EMBASSIES

[https://perma.cc/H4N3-KDHC]

AND

(follow

MISSIONS

ABROAD,

"Embassies

and

Missions" hyperlink, then "West Asia" hyperlink, then "Russian Federation" hyperlink) (last
visited Apr. 15, 2020) (noting Russia has an economic and cultural office in Taiwan, like so many
other major world powers).
140. Lee, supra note 2, at 357-59.

141. Id. at 360.
142. Lee, supra note 2, at 359-61.
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visa waiver program with Taiwan, where passport holders from both
locations can enter the other state without a visa.1 4 3
The U.K. maintains only unofficial ties with Taiwan, but it has also
enacted legislation that shows implicit support for Taiwan's independent
status. In 1991, the U.K. parliament established the "Foreign
Corporations Act," a law that suggests Taiwan has the qualities of a
recognized state.144 The law regulated the legal status in U.K. courts of
bodies "incorporated in territories not part of a State recognised (sic) by
the British Government."1 45 The primary purpose of the legislation was
the concern "about the legal status of commercial institutions
incorporated in territories such as Taiwan and North Korea."1 4 6 While the
law only contemplates private law matters, "it establishes Taiwan as a
stable regime with settled laws as if it were a recognized state."1 47 The
U.K. has a de facto embassy in Taipei and also maintains a visa waiver
program, much like nearly every nation in Europe. 148 It, like the U.S.,
recognizes that the P.R.C. is the "sole legitimate government of China"
but only "acknowledges" the P.R.C.'s claim to Taiwan. 149
Japan is another example of a state that shows support for Taiwan's
recognition as a state. In 2014, the Japanese executive authorized a
reinterpretation of the formerly restrictive definition of "self-defense" in
the Japanese constitution. Previously, the official interpretation of
Japan's constitution only allowed Japan to exercise self-defense if there
was a direct attack on Japan. The 2014 change allows Japan to defend its
allies under three circumstances: (1) "the attack on that country poses a
clear danger to Japan's survival or could fundamentally overturn
Japanese citizens' constitutional rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness," (2) "there is no other way of repelling the attack and

143. Canadian citizens may visit the R.O.C. for 90 days without a visa, and R.O.C. citizens
may visit Canada for up to 180 days without a visa. CANADA AND TAIWAN RELATIONS,
https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/taiwan/relations.aspx?lang-eng [https://permacc/
HT57-Q8BR];

CANADA

ANNOUNCES

VISA

WAIVER

FOR

TAIWAN,

https://www.roc-

taiwan.org/usseaen/post/5980.html [https://perma.cc/BR2D-4A4E].

144. Ilona Cheyne, The Foreign CorporationsAct, 40 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 983, 983-84
(1991) (citing H.L. Bill 51, 1990-1991).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Anne Hsiu-An Hsiao, Is China's Policy to Use Force againstTaiwan a Violation of the
Principle of Non-Use of Force under InternationalLaw, 32 NEw ENG. L. REV. 715, 741 (1998).
148. FOREIGN TRAVEL ADVICE: TAIWAN, https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/taiwan/
entry-requirements; VISA-EXEMPT ENTRY, https://www.bocagov.tw/cp-149-4486-7785a-2.html

[https://perma.cc/PD9L-FCKP] (last visited Apr. 15, 2020).
149. Lee, supra note 2, at 357-61.
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protecting Japan and its citizens," or (3) "the use of force is limited to the
minimum necessary."' 5 0
Some have argued that this change, although not explicit, was directly
related to Japan's ability to defend Taiwan.1 5 ' A draft of the constitutional
interpretation stated that Japan would be able to defend countries with
which it had "close relations."' 5 2 Considering China and Korea's ever
present strains of disdain for Japan, and Japan's decades long disputes
with Russia over the Kuril Islands, Taiwan's government is often
considered the most Japan-friendly government in all of Asia. 5 3 While
this Japanese constitutional change is vague (much like nearly all other
international Taiwan related legislation), it, at a minimum opens a door
for Japanese defense of Taiwan.
In addition to the constitutional change, Japan has also taken other
recent steps to promote its security and economic relationship with
Taiwan, which also bolsters the case for Taiwan's recognition. In 2016,
Japan held a maritime cooperation dialogue with Taiwan to increase
collaboration between Japanese and Taiwanese fisheries and maritime
scientific research, as well as collaboration between their Coast
Guards.' 5 4 In 2017, Japan changed the name of its de facto embassy in
Taiwan from "Interchange Association" to "Japan-Taiwan Exchange
Association,"" 5 which drew a stern rebuke from the P.R.C. for violating
the "One-China Policy."' 56
Just like Canada, the U.K., and Japan, the U.S. does not have formal
diplomatic relations with Taiwan, but the U.S. may be the most
150. Ayako Mie, Abe Wins Battle to Broaden Defense Policy, JAPAN TIMES (July 1, 2014),
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/07/01/national/coalition-agrees-on-scrapping-pacifistpostwar-defense-policy [https://permacc/73ZH-A5Q9].

151. Zachary Keck, Taiwan and Japan's Collective Self-Defense, THE
2, 2014),

DIPLOMAT

https://thediplomat.com/2014/07/taiwan-and-japans-collective-self-defense/

(July

[https://

permaccfr32Y-JLDM].
152. Rushing on collective self-defense, JAPAN TIMES (June 29, 2014), https://www.japan

times.co.jp/opinion/2014/06/29/editorials/rushing-collective-self-defense/ [https://perma.cc/45R
5-6QBR].
153. Misato Matsuoka & Michal Thim, The Odd Couple: Japan & Taiwan's Unlikely
Friendship, THE DIPLOMAT (May 15, 2014), https://thediplomat.com/2014/05/the-odd-couplejapan-taiwans-unlikely-friendship/ [https://perma.cc/5QFF-BYD9].
154. Jeffrey W. Hornung, Strong But ConstrainedJapan-TaiwanTies, BROOKINGS (Mar. 13,
2018),

https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/strong-but-constrained-japan-taiwan-ties/

[https:/

permacc/RY2B-WMB4].
155. Chang Mao-sen, Foreign Ministry Supports Name Change, TAIPEI TIMES (Dec. 29,

2016), https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2016/12/29/2003662107
.cc/HLQ7-DF6A].

[https://perma

156. A spokesperson from the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated: "We firmly oppose any
countries that have forged diplomatic ties with China maintaining official relations with Taiwan
in any form." China denounces name change of Taiwan body in Japan, CHINA DAILY (May 5,
[https://perma
2017), https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-05/17/content_29389434.htm

.cc/Q2C6-AJ36].
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significant example of a state with de facto diplomatic relations with
Taiwan. The U.S. State Department's official position is that the U.S.
"does not support Taiwan's independence."1 57 However, U.S. practice is
more complex than the State Department suggests, and it indicates
significant characteristics of de jure state recognition of Taiwan.
Since the U.N. removed the R.O.C./Taiwan's membership in 1971,
the U.S. has laced its relationship with Taiwan with "strategic ambiguity"
to preserve its highly political relationship with the P.R.C. In all three of
the U.S.-P.R.C. joint communiques, the U.S. never agreed with the
P.R.C.'s claim over Taiwan-it simply "acknowledged" and
"recognized" the P.R.C.'s claims. 158 Despite the ambiguity of the
communiques, in 1979 the U.S. Government passed the Taiwan Relations
Act (TRA) showing U.S. support for Taiwan, including the commitment
to sell "defense articles and defense services" to Taiwan.' 5 9 Since 1979,
the U.S. Congress and many White House Administrations have
consistently renewed relations with Taiwan.1 60
Since the end of WWII, the U.S. has consistently demonstrated
military support for Taiwan. 16 1 In accordance with the TRA and the joint
communiques, during the last four decades, the U.S. has repeatedly
completed multi-billion dollar foreign military sales.' 62 These sales make
Taiwan the U.S.' second largest customer for foreign military sales.1 63
President George W. Bush's administration sold at least $15 billion of
military equipment to Taiwan, and President Obama's administration
sold over $14 billion. 164 President Trump's administration has sold
Taiwan nearly $4.5 billion worth of military equipment. 165 As of April
2019, the president and State Department have approved an additional $8
157. US. Relations With Taiwan, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (2018), https://www.state.gov/u-srelations-with-taiwan/ [https://perma.cc/3DZW-TH5P] (last visited Apr. 15, 2020).
158. US. Relations With Taiwan, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (2018), https://www.state.gov/u-srelations-with-taiwan/ [https://perma.cc/8LPA-WG9P] (last visited Apr. 15, 2020).
159. Taiwan Relations Act, supra note 49 at §3(a).
160. See H.R. Res. 88, 114th Cong. (2015), https://www.congress.gov/bill/1 14thcongress/house-concurrent-resolution/88/text/eh [https://perma.cc/5JYX-FLJP]; see LAWRENCE
& MORRISON, supra note 9, at 29-31 (Noting that since the enactment of the Taiwan Relations
Act all U.S. presidential administrations have sold armaments to Taiwan, however, "the largest
amount" of arms ever sold after the enactment of the Act took place under the Obama
administration over a seven year period starting in 2009.).
161. Lindsay Maizland, US Military Support of Taiwan: What's Changed Under Trump,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/us-military-supporttaiwan-whats-changed-under-trump [https://perma.cc/PC3Q-G7GC].
162. LAWRENCE & MORRISON, supra note 9, at 1.
163. Id.
164. Maizland, supra note 161.
165. Cary Huang, Under Trump, US Arms Sales to Taiwan Could Be the New Normal, S.
CHINA MORNING POsT (Aug. 25, 2019), https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/3024
132/under-trump-us-arms-sales-taiwan-could-be-new-normal [https://perma.cc/YQY4-ZNP7].
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billion sale, including the most advanced F-16 fighter jets, but the Senate
has not yet finalized the sale.1 66
Like Taiwan's recognition status, international law is unclear on the
legality of military sales to contested states. On its face, selling arms to
an unrecognized state appears to be a violation of international law. With
the P.R.C.'s longstanding claim that the dispute between the renegade
state of Taiwan and the P.R.C. is purely an internal conflict, the P.R.C.
government views the sales as a violation of its sovereignty. In 2019,
Geng Shuang, the spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said that
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are a violation of international law because
they are a "crude interference in China's internal affairs, harming China's
sovereignty and security interests."167
The International Court of Justice held in the case of Nicaragua v.
U.S. that the U.S. violated customary international law by selling arms to
the anti-Sandinista contras because it was unlawful intervention into the
internal affairs of another state.1 6 8 Although Taiwan is not a rebel group
directly comparable to the Nicaraguan contras, it can be argued that the
sale of arms to a non-state group is comparable to the Taiwan case. If
Taiwan is in fact Chinese sovereign territory, then the sale of arms to
Taiwan is likely a violation of customary international law; however, the
international community's position on the status of Taiwan is still
unclear.
This dispute over U.S. arms sales highlights the U.S.' policy of
"strategic ambiguity." As previously discussed, the U.S. does not
formally recognize Taiwan and it formally recognizes the P.R.C., but the
U.S. has only acknowledged (and never agreed with) the P.R.C.'s claim
of sovereignty over Taiwan.1 69 This acknowledgement mirrors the
position of essentially every other world power except Russia.1 70
Although the U.S. severed formal ties with Taiwan in 1979 for political
reasons, the U.S. never formally stated that Taiwan is not a state, and its
sale of arms to Taiwan shows that the U.S. treats Taiwan like a fully
recognized state. Any other interpretation would suggest that the U.S. is
blatantly violating the non-intervention principle of international law by
selling arms to a rebellious province of the P.R.C. The state practice of
the U.S. and other nations contradicts the P.R.C.'s position that Taiwan
166. Reuters Staff, State Departmentapprovespossible $8 billionfighterjet sale to Taiwan:
Pentagon, REUTERS (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-taiwan-aircraft/

state-dept-approves-possible-8-billion-fighter-jet-sale-to-taiwan-pentagon-idUSKCNI VA29F
[https://perma.cc/M9NT-TVKH].

167. US State DepartmentApproves Possible $2.2 Billion Arms Sale to Taiwan, REUTERS
(July 8, 2019),

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-taiwan/u-s-state-department-approves-

possible-2-2-billion-arms-sale-to-taiwan-idUSKCN IU32HT.
168. Nicaragua Case, supra note 106, ¶¶ 242, 246.
169. Lee, supra note 2, at 357-59

170. Id.
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is its sovereign territory, thus it is unlikely that the U.S.' arms sales to
Taiwan would violate international law.
In addition to military support, the U.S. also maintains strong cultural
and economic ties with Taiwan. As of 2016, the U.S. was Taiwan's
second largest trading partner (behind the P.R.C.), and Taiwan was the
U.S.' tenth largest trading partner.171 The U.S. also maintains a visa
waiver program with Taiwan.1 7 2 Of the 38 states with which the U.S.
maintains a visa waiver program, Taiwan is the only member that does
not have diplomatic relations with the U.S.1 73 Lastly, although the U.S.
only maintains embassies in nations with which it has full diplomatic
relations, the U.S. operates a de facto embassy in Taiwan called the
American Institute in Taiwan (AIT). 174 Over 500 U.S. and local personnel
work at the AIT, including active duty military personnel from the Army,
Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps.1 7 5 The AIT provides consular
services to U.S. citizens, which are generally only provided by
embassies.1 76
The U.S.' cultural, economic, and military ties to Taiwan show that
the U.S. effectively treats Taiwan like an independent state. Although the
U.S. does not formally recognize Taiwan, its defacto recognition should
in some respects be recognized by the international community as dejure
recognition because the relationship is almost identical to de jure
recognition, particularly with the U.S.' sale of arms to Taiwan. With such
an open and notorious deed exclaiming the U.S.' implicit de jure
recognition of Taiwan, it almost seems strange that the P.R.C. has never
sought redress from the U.N. about the matter. 17 7
The relationships of the U.S. and other large nations show a strange
dichotomy. They all seem to treat Taiwan like an independent state,
entirely separate from the P.R.C., yet they do not formally recognize it.
Under the constitutive theory, formal recognition is required to achieve
state recognition, but formal recognition for Taiwan is highly unlikely
due to the P.R.C.'s staunch position against Taiwanese independence.
The P.R.C.'s aggressive overtones fuel one of the greatest falsehoods
currently observed in international law-that Taiwan looks like a state,
acts like a state, is treated like a state, but it is not formally recognized as
171. LAWRENCE

&

MORRISON, supra

note 9, at 36.

172. Id. at 37.
173. Id. at 38.
174. Id. at 15.
175. Id. at 15; Lawrence Chung, US Prepares to Open New De Facto Embassy in Taipei

Amid 'Policy Shift' on Taiwan, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 6, 2019), https://www.scmp.com/
news/china/diplomacy/article/3004910/us-prepares-open-new-de-facto-embassy-taipei-amid-

policy-shift [https://permacc/G3TM-TKR7].
176. LAWRENCE & MORRISON, supra note 9, at 15.
177. It is the author's own assertion that the P.R.C.'s failure to address the issue may also be
calculated at protecting status quo.
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a state. The current international law framework of state recognition does
not account for the P.R.C.'s threats of force to defend what it
characterizes (yet only one other state supports) as its own sovereign land.
Due to this political reality, Taiwan's de facto recognition by so many
world powers should at least be partially accepted as de jure recognition
in the international community, with its accompanying rights and
obligations in international law.
Although the real-world practice of so many states supports Taiwan's
independence, there are opponents to allowing states to gain recognition
without fully complying with the law. These opponents contest that if
recognition by a limited number of states actually grants a nation the
rights and obligations of widely accepted states, then other nations can
use "state recognition" as a weapon to violate international law.1 7 8 For
example, Kosovo's widespread recognition in February 2008 may have
set a precedent that foreign recognition equates to a state's legality.1 7 9
In August 2008, Russia, in an apparent retaliation for the U.S. and
European recognition of Kosovo, invaded Georgia "to defend the ethnic
Russian minorities in the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia."' 80 A scholar stated that Russia's "subsequent recognition of the
two territories as States independent of Georgia . .. should serve as a
stern warning of the importance of legality and the dire consequences of
ignoring legal rules and principles that apply to statehood."181 Based on
this argument, Russia or other states could claim to recognize a contested
state, then, in order to meet its own national interests, use "collective selfdefense" of that state as a pretext for invasion. This position seeks to limit
the rights of contested states to ensure stability in international relations.
However, Taiwan withstands this argument because, much like Kosovo,
it is widely recognized (de facto, at least), 8 2 whereas Russia's
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and subsequent invasion, was
completed in a vacuum with very little outside support.1 83
Robert Chan disputes Taiwan's independence based on both the
declaratory and constitutive theories of recognition. He argues that no
matter how much Taiwan looks like a state, it cannot be a state under the
declaratory theory because its claim to independence is an illegality-it
is a belligerent occupation of Chinese territory that never gained
178. Chan, supra note 23, at 466.

179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Kosovo is recognized by nearly 100 states. Henderson, supranote 109, at 370 n.1 1.

183. Abkhazia is only recognized by Russia, Syria, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, Tuvalu,
and Vanuatu and also by the partially recognized states of South Ossetia, Transnistria, and
Nagorno-Karabakh; South Ossetia is recognized by Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Tuvalu, and
Nauru and the partially recognized states of Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transnistria.
Henderson, supra note 109, at 369-70 n.10.
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independence.1 84 Regarding the constitutive theory, Chan uses the
Montevideo convention itself, citing Article 3, which says "statehood is
independent of recognition."1 85
In conclusion, Taiwan's recognition is still unsettled in international
law because the current framework of declaratory and constitutive
recognition does not sufficiently encompass the political reality of the
power that a single state can have on worldwide decision-making. Under
the declaratory theory, Taiwan meets all the requirements for statehood,
save for the potential requirement of a formal declaration of
independence. Under the constitutive theory, Taiwan enjoys widespread
defacto recognition, but is only formally recognized by 14 small states.
The issue stopping Taiwan's unambiguous recognition under both
theories is the P.R.C.'s unabashed position on its sovereignty over the
island. At present, the desire of nations around the world to avoid conflict
with the P.R.C. prevents Taiwan from receiving all the benefits and
obligations of a fully recognized state.
Despite Taiwan's contested state recognition, it can still enjoy some
of the rights of fully recognized states under a different theory of
international law: "'peoples' right to self-determination." Supposing that
the P.R.C.'s threats prevent Taiwan from ever gaining widespread formal
recognition, the right to self-determination can grant "state-like" rights to
the people of Taiwan if the Taiwanese qualify as a distinct "people."
B. Taiwan as a "People" and Self-Determination
The burgeoning international law right of self-determination creates
state-like rights for groups of "peoples," and the people of Taiwan are
entitled to these rights by international law. Yet, due to the analysis
below, the principle of self-determination will not ultimately affect
Taiwan's ability to invite third-party nations to defend it in the event of a
P.R.C. attack. In this section I will analyze whether the Taiwanese meet
the definition of a "people," the P.R.C.'s state practice regarding selfdetermination, how Taiwan currently seems to enjoy the right to selfdetermination, and how self-determination can neither grant Taiwan the
right to secession, nor can it independently grant Taiwan the right to
invite collective self-defense.
The definition of "peoples" under international law is not clear, but
many experts agree that the Taiwanese qualify as a "people." 86 A
commonly accepted definition of self-determination comes from U.N.
General Assembly Resolution 1541, which defined "peoples" as a group
184. Chan, supra note 23.

185. Id. at 465.
186. James Crawford stated: "Whether or not there was such a people [as the Taiwanese] in
1947, the experience of half a century of separate self-government has tended to create one."
CRAWFORD,

supra note 42, at 220.
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found in "a territory which is geographically separate and is distinct
ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering it."187 This
definition highlights how the right to self-determination does not
perfectly apply to Taiwan because the P.R.C. does not exercise any
administration over the R.O.C./Taiwan. Although the P.R.C. does not
administer Taiwan, it may be argued that the P.R.C. continues to exercise
influence over the territory of Taiwan by preventing it from achieving
state recognition.
Looking at the U.N. definition more closely, Taiwan, as an island, is
unquestionably geographically distinct from Mainland China. The
definition also requires a people who are either culturally or ethnically
distinct from the administering state. Taiwan has a population of
approximately 23 million people, the vast majority of which are
ethnically identical to the Han Chinese people of Mainland China.1 88 The
Han Chinese people first migrated to Taiwan during the 14th-17th
century. Then in the 1940s, the R.O.C. fled to Taiwan causing a mass
influx of persons from mainland China and increasing the population of
Taiwan by approximately seventeen percent. 8 9 Today, the Han Chinese
comprise over ninety-eight percent of the Taiwanese people.1 9 0 The
remaining two percent of the population are the aboriginal Austronesian
91
peoples who have lived in Taiwan for many thousands of years.'
Though they are a small percentage of the people numerically, the
aboriginal people's culture has integrated to create a unique cultural blend
with the Han Chinese in Taiwan. Even with the integration of the
aboriginal culture, because Taiwan's truly ethnically distinct people are
so few, many experts agree that the Taiwanese qualify as a people not
because they are ethnically different, but because they are culturally

different.1 9 2
The Taiwanese have been culturally separated from Mainland China
since 1895 when the Japanese took control of the island. During this time,
Japanese culture was adopted through many aspects of Taiwanese

187. G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), supra note 83.
188. Stephen Allen, Recreating One China: Internal Self-Determination, Autonomy and the

Future of Taiwan, 4 Asia-PAC. J. ON HUM. RTs. & L. 21 33 (2003).
189. Charney & Prescott, supra note 12, at 473.
190. Michael Turton,
Ghost of Past Identities, TAIPEI TIMES (Nov. 23, 2020),
https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2020/11/23/2003747415.
191. Cindy Sui, TribalCulture Survives in Taiwan, BRIT. BROAD. Co. (BBC) (Oct. 6, 2011),
[https://perma.cc/
http://www.bbc.com/travel/story/20110930-tribal-culture-survives-in-taiwan

3K9D-WSRJ].
192. Ediger, supra note 25, at 1696-97; see also Stephen Allen, Recreating One China:

InternalSelf-Determination, Autonomy and the Future of Taiwan, 4 Asia-PAC. J. ON HUM. Rts.
& L. 21 33 (2003); but see, Shen, supra note 121, atl 101. Where Shen argues that "Taiwan does

not qualify as a "people."
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society. 9 3 Since the end of Japanese rule in 1945, R.O.C. governance
maintained a culture with stark differences to Mainland China. The
largest factors that impact Taiwan's cultural distinctions include the lack
of religious suppression, a market economy with international economic
exchange, and full democratic freedoms since the 1990s. 194 These unique
characteristics of Taiwan's culture fit well into the U.N. Education,
Scientific & Cultural Organization's definition of "peoples," which
states: "A people is a group of individual human beings with a common
historical tradition, racial or ethnic identity, culture, language, religion,
territory, or economic life."1 95 This broader definition of "peoples" shows
that the Taiwanese people satisfy many facets of what make a "people"
distinct. The Taiwanese peoples' unique ethnic, religious, economic, and
territorial differences from Mainland Chinese show that they are a
separate "people" who should qualify for special rights.
It is a sensitive topic on both sides of the Taiwan Strait for the
Taiwanese to formally gain the status of a "people." For the Taiwanese,
seeking the status of a "people" may implicitly state that, first, the P.R.C.
administers control over them to begin with, and second, that it seeks the
P.R.C.'s blessing to continue to self-determine its government and
status-both of which are unacceptable positions for the Taiwanese. For
the P.R.C., granting the Taiwanese such a status would formally require
them to yield control of authority to the Taiwanese. The P.R.C. rejects
any claims Taiwan may have to self-determination-it treats Taiwan as
an integral part of its nation, culturally and ethnically identical-only
temporarily separated in government.
In practice, however, the P.R.C. does not actually recognize the notion
of "peoples" and their accompanying rights to self-determination under
international law.' 96 Because of the P.R.C.'s translations and
interpretations of international law, even if the Taiwanese were willing to
assume the status of a "people" under P.R.C. rule, it is unlikely the P.R.C.
government would actually grant them special authority over their
territory. The way the P.R.C. government has changed the language of
the ICCPR and the ICESCR shows how the government has rejected the
notion that "peoples" have any special rights at all. The original Chinese
language versions of these two human rights covenants translated the
word "peoples" into the Chinese word KM (minzu), which literally
193. Allen, supra note 188.
194. LAWRENCE & MORRISON, supra note 9.

195. U.N. Educ., Sci. & Cultural Org., InternationalMeeting of Experts on FurtherStudy of

the Concept of the Rights of Peoples,

¶ 22, U.N. Doc. SHS-89/CONF.602/7 (Feb. 22, 1990),

https://www.michaelkirby.com.au/images/stories/speeches/1980s/vol21/819-UNESCO

-_Rights

ofPeoples_Official_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/UZ5X-S7JU].
196. Anonymous, China and the Principle of Self-Determination of Peoples, 6 SAINT
ANTONY'S INT'L REV. 79,93 (2010), http://www.columbia.edu/~jds3/Self-determination/OxfordSTAIR%20China&Secession.pdf [https://perma.cc/WM56-MJKB].
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means ethnic groups, and is generally translated into English as the word
"nationalities."1 9 7 After the P.R.C. took the R.O.C.'s seat at the U.N., it
became "alarmed at the notion that its fifty-five officially recognized
nationalities . . . might be entitled to self-determine." 19 8 Eventually, the
P.R.C. government ratified a version of the ICESCR that changed the
(minzu, or "ethnic groups") to )K
translation of "peoples" from &
(renmin), which translates as "people," or "citizenry," and has no
connection to the notion of a separate ethic or cultural group.199 By
altering the meaning of these texts, the P.R.C. has removed the
underlying purpose of the covenants that give rights to distinct groups of
cultural or ethnic people.
Beyond changing the meaning of international covenants, two
examples in past and modern P.R.C. history show how the P.R.C. has not
respected the right to self-determination. The two examples are the cases
of Tibet and Xinjiang, both of which are internationally recognized to
have culturally and ethnically distinct groups of peoples. First, the
Tibetans have never exercised self-determination under P.R.C. rule. After
the P.R.C. government took actual control over Tibet in the 1950s, and
subsequently promised autonomy to the Tibetans, the P.R.C. effectively
removed any ability of the Tibetan people to exercise any governance
over their people. 20 Consequently, the U.N., over the course of decades,
has repeatedly condemned the P.R.C. for violating the Tibetan people's
rights to self-determination. 20 1
Second, the P.R.C.'s treatment of the Uighur people in Xinjiang has
also drawn an exceptional amount of international attention in recent
years. The Uighurs are a Muslim ethnic minority who have been
systematically repressed for many decades, and recently, the P.R.C. has
interned over one million Uighurs in hundreds of "reeducation camps"
all throughout Xinjiang Province. 2 02 The P.R.C.'s stance is that the
detained Uighurs are religious extremists with links to terrorism, but most
reports suggest the P.R.C. is waging a war against Muslims in general,
with the intent to extinguish all disloyalty to the Communist Party. 203 In
197. Id. at 85.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 86. While the P.R.C ratified the ICESCR, they only signed but did not ratify the
ICCPR. Id.
200. China and the Principleof Self-Determination ofPeoples, supranote 196, at 196.
201. G.A. Res. 1723 (XVI), at 10 (Dec. 20, 1960); see also China Must Urgently Address
Rights Violations in Tibet-UN Senior Official, U.N. NEWS (Nov. 2, 2012), https://news.un.org/
en/story/2012/11 /424662-china-must-urgently-address-rights-violations-tibet-un-senior-official

[https://perma.cc/YC5S-XTJN].
202. Lindsay Maizland, China 's Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELS. (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uighurs-xinjiang

[https://perma.cc/UK6X-ELDZ].
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recent decades, Uighur riots and protests against the communist party's
repressive policies have increasingly drawn global attention, but the
P.R.C.'s response seems to grow only more oppressive. 204
Because the P.R.C. generally rejects the right to self-determination,
even if the Taiwanese were willing to exercise political autonomy under
P.R.C. administration, this principle would never guarantee Taiwan any
political autonomy from the P.R.C. Although the P.R.C. rejects the right
of self-determination of "peoples," it has repeatedly offered Taiwan a
quasi-self-determination arrangement called "one country, two
systems." 20 5 The president of Taiwan has summarily rejected the P.R.C.'s
offers. 2 06 The P.R.C. uses this "one country, two systems" theme to
describe its relationship with Hong Kong and Macau, but the political
experience of Hong Kong since 1997 demonstrates how the P.R.C. may
not intend to offer any lasting autonomy to Taiwan. 2 07 On its face, the
P.R.C.'s offer seems to guarantee the rights of self-determinationallowing Taiwan to maintain a democratic government and social and
religious freedoms, but in light of the promises and subsequent
experiences of Tibet, Xinjiang, and now Hong Kong, few see this offer
as advantageous for Taiwan.
Although the P.R.C. has repeatedly offered the "one country, two
systems" approach, Taiwan's self-governance suggests that it already
enjoys all the rights of self-determination. According to Common Article
1 of the ICCPR and the ICESCR, self-determination means that peoples
have the right to "freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development." 2 08 The Taiwanese
enjoy all of these rights because Taiwan has full control over every aspect
of its government and society.
Another key issue is how accepting a "one country, two systems"
administration under the P.R.C. may benefit Taiwan under international
law. The Canadian Supreme Court, discussing the right to secession,
raised the possibility that "peoples" may have the right to secede if they
are denied "any meaningful exercise of [the] right to selfdetermination." 2 09 This possibility has little support in state practice
because, outside of the colonial context, "no state which has been created
204. Id
205. Yimou Lee, Taiwan Leader Rejects China's 'One Country, Two Systems' Offer,
REUTERS (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-anniversary-president/taiwan
-leader-rejects-chinas-one-country-two-systems-offer-idUSKBNI WPOA4 [https:/perma.cc/7Q

9A-KRUN].
206. Id.
207. Hong Kong's Political Crisis Deepens After the Worst Day of Violence in Decades,
TIME (Oct. 1, 2019), https://time.com/5690681/hong-kong-crisis-unrest-protests/ [https://perma

.cc/862T-GXLM].
208. ICCPR, supra note 81; ICESCR, supra note 81.
209. Secession of Quebec, supra note 87.
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by unilateral secession has been admitted to the United Nations against
the declared wishes of the government of the predecessor State." 2 10
Thus, if Taiwan accepts a "one country, two systems" administration
from the P.R.C., it stands to gain essentially nothing from international
law if the P.R.C. infringes on its rights to self-determine, except for
international sympathy. A simple review of how the Tibetans and
Uighurs have fared under Chinese control demonstrates how little the
principle of self-determination, and the accompanying worldwide
sympathy, creates remedies for repressed peoples. Most importantly, if
Taiwan accepts P.R.C. administration and the rights of selfdetermination, it will cast off its claim as an independent state and all of
its associated claims in international law, including, potentially, the right
to self-defense.
Therefore, although the people of Taiwan can qualify for special
rights under the principle of self-determination, accepting P.R.C.
administration will ultimately prevent Taiwan's long-term goal of
widespread state recognition. 211 In summary, based on international law
and Taiwan's present state of self-governance, the right to selfdetermination itself will have little impact on Taiwan gaining formal
recognition or its ability to lawfully invite the defense of third-party
nations.
C. Prohibition on the Use of Force Between China and Taiwan
The U.N. Charter's Article 2(4) prohibits the P.R.C. from using force
against Taiwan if such a use of force would harm international peace and
security.2 12 The basis for this prohibition comes from vague language,
however, so the matter is still contested. This section will explain why
Article 2(4) should protect Taiwan from a Chinese use of force, even if
the P.R.C. views Taiwan as its own sovereign territory.
The P.R.C. claims that the dispute with Taiwan is purely an internal
matter and that no external force should interfere in the matter. 2 13 Because
the P.R.C. views Taiwan as a renegade province that must eventually be
reunited with the mainland, it believes it can take any measure necessary,
including force, to protect its territorial integrity. But international law
210. Crawford, supra note 86, at 92. It is the author's own assertion, however, that; However,

states do not need to be admitted into the U.N. to gain both the rights and obligations of statesbut U.N. membership can indicate widespread recognition of a state.
211. This Article will not discuss the "responsibility to protect" theory of international law,
nor discuss examples, like Kosovo, where states have attempted or succeeded to secede from a
parent nation due to humanitarian abuses. See generally Christopher R. Rossi, The International

Community, South Sudan, and the Responsibility to Protect, 49 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 129
(2016).
212. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
213. Hsiao, supra note 147, at 718.
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likely prevents the P.R.C. from using force to reunite Taiwan. Article 2(4)
provides that states must "refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations," 214 and one of the purposes of the U.N.
is "to maintain international peace and security... and to bring about by
peaceful means... [the] settlement of international disputes or situations
that might lead to a breach of the peace." 2 15
The P.R.C. views a use of force against Taiwan as consistent with
international law because Taiwan is an integral part of its sovereign
territory, thus any interaction with Taiwan is not a form of "international
relations." Furthermore, the P.R.C. believes any use of force to defend its
territorial integrity would benefit international peace and security rather
than harm it because preventing states from quelling secession attempts
may upend the Westphalian concept of state sovereignty all together. The
P.R.C. can cite as an example Russia's use of force, including gross
human rights violations, to prevent secession in Chechnya. In that
instance, France, the U.K., and the U.S. supported Russia's efforts to
protect its territorial integrity.
Although the U.S. and other nations have supported the use of force
to protect territorial integrity, the factual basis for each use of force is
always different, and not every use of force in this context is worthy of
support. In the case of Taiwan, the P.R.C. faces a much more complex
international environment than the example of Russia and Chechnya
because of Taiwan's extensive international relationships. Taiwan has
strong informal relationships with essentially every world power,
including the regional Asian powers of Japan and Korea, both of which
have strong ties with the U.S. While the U.S., Japan, and Korea all
formally recognize the P.R.C. and not Taiwan, all three nations share an
interest in a free and open Pacific, and Taiwan's social and economic
freedoms have become a symbol of freedom in the Asia Pacific region.
Because of Taiwan's extensive international relationships, many
nations would view an attack on Taiwan as a breach of international
peace. As discussed above, Taiwan is considered Japan's greatest ally in
Asia, and Japan recently changed its constitution to allow the defense of
allies if an attack on its ally poses a threat to Japan's survival. 2 16 Because
Japan and Taiwan share similar territorial disputes with the P.R.C., if
there ever was an attack on one of Japan's allies that could threaten Japan,
it would be its greatest ally in Asia-Taiwan. And beyond Taiwan's
relationships in the Far East, Taiwan has strong relationships in the West.
Canada specifically stated it does not recognize the P.R.C.'s sovereignty
214. U.N. Charter, supra note 212.
215. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 1.
216. Mie, supra note 150.
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over Taiwan, very few western nations have expressed support for the
P.R.C.s claim of sovereignty over Taiwan, and the U.S. has enacted
specific domestic legislation to support the defense of Taiwan.
Additionally, Taiwan's strong relationships must not be considered in
an isolated context. Many of these countries, particularly Japan and the
U.S., have had long-standing disputes with the P.R.C., whether they are
territorial, economic, historical, or cultural. Also, many in the
international community increasingly view the P.R.C. as a threat to
international peace and security due to its aggressive and controversial
actions throughout the South China Sea. 217 When Taiwan's strong
relationships are viewed in context with these significant international
disputes with the P.R.C., any use of force against Taiwan is much more
likely to face international condemnation and be considered a breach of
peace and international security. Accordingly, if the P.R.C. uses force
against Taiwan, even if characterized as a purely internal issue, the
international community would likely consider it non-peaceful dispute
settlement and a breach of the peace, and therefore a violation of the
prohibition on the use of force found in Article 2(4) of the U.N. If the
P.R.C. uses force against Taiwan, the subsequent legal question is
whether third-party states may come to Taiwan's defense, which will be
analyzed below.
D. Collective Self-Defense of Taiwan
Fifty years after Taiwan lost its membership in the U.N., tensions
remain high between the P.R.C. and Taiwan. The P.R.C.'s political will
to fulfill its "sacred duty" of reunifying Taiwan seems to grow ever
stronger.2 18 Taiwan's pro-independence president was recently reelected, and the potential for conflict looms over the Taiwan Strait. If the
P.R.C. launches an armed attack against Taiwan, international law
supports the U.S. and other states exercising collective self-defense of
Taiwan. This is primarily because Taiwan's current status and
relationships show that Taiwan already enjoys both the rights and
obligation of states. This section will analyze why Taiwan has the right
to invite collective self-defense by discussing Taiwan's state recognition,
focusing on both the declarative and constitutive theories of recognition.
It will also explain what is required of the U.S. and other U.N. members
before they exercise a collective self-defense of Taiwan-namely they
must formally recognize Taiwan as a state.
The U.N. Charter establishes states' customary rights of individual
and collective self-defense, but it is silent about contested states. The
reason why international law is generally silent about the rights and
217. Stashwick, supra note 7.
218. Anti-Secession Law, supra note 134.
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obligations of contested states is because international law is a system
based on the agreement of parties, and the system lacks a competent body
to "determine with certainty the [parties] of the system." 2 19 n
international law, no single state or international organization controls
whether a state has become a party to the system.
The status of Taiwan's statehood hinges on the declarative and
constitutive theories of state recognition. These theories offer an "all or
nothing" approach to state recognition, an approach that is practically and
theoretically impossible. Taiwan is widely recognized to meet the
requirements of statehood under the declarative theory. And under the
constitutive theory, some states, but not all states, support Taiwan's
statehood. Thus, because Taiwan has state status in the eyes of some, it
is uncontroversial that the international community requires Taiwan to
comply with the obligations required of all states, such as the customary
prohibition on the use of force. Yet, as a contested state, Taiwan cannot
pretend to be bound by the prohibition on the use of force against only
those states that recognize it-Taiwan's obligations extend to all states.
Further, it is illogical to suggest that Taiwan is expected to uphold the
obligations of states, yet can be denied the inherent right of a state to
individual and collective self-defense-or that it may only exercise selfdefense against the nations with which it has formal relationships. In
other words, the international community cannot expect that Taiwan hold
statehood and lack statehood simultaneously.
Regarding Taiwan's disputed status, international law provides no
solution that will satisfy both Taiwan and the P.R.C. Furthermore,
international law lacks the comprehensiveness required to encompass the
inherently political nature of state recognition. Under this system, there
may always be disagreement about Taiwan's status and any rights it
exercises, including the right to collective self-defense. In essence,
disagreements over contested states are related to each individual state's
political will and respective efforts to follow their obligations under
international law, whether they are based in custom or treaty. Based on
the current U.N. construct, Taiwan will never become a member of the
U.N., so Taiwan's global interaction will be based on only customary
international law. U.N. member states' interactions with Taiwan must
comply with both customary law and their U.N. treaty obligations.
From the individual state perspective, Taiwan believes it can exercise
individual and collective self-defense because it is a state under both the
declaratory and constitutive theories of state recognition. Taiwan believes
it satisfies the Montevideo Convention and the declaratory theory of state
recognition. Under the constitutive theory, Taiwan acknowledges that
there is no specified number of states that must formally recognize
219. CRAWFORD, supra note 42, at 20.
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Taiwan before it can unambiguously exercise the rights of a state. Some
suggest U.N. membership as an ideal test, but that test is politically and
practically flawed in Taiwan's case because of the P.R.C.'s membership
on the Security Council. From Taiwan's perspective, because there is no
minimum standard for recognition, Taiwan, which has formal relations
with 14 states and quasi-formal relations with 57 other states, must
qualify to exercise the rights and obligations of a state, including the right
to individual and collective self-defense.
Other individual states, namely the P.R.C., unequivocally reject
Taiwan's claim to statehood (under either theory of recognition), but their
position does not equate to legal authority. Customary law is unclear on
the rights of contested states, and the U.N. Charter is also silent on the
matter. Despite its dispute with Taiwan, the P.R.C., as a member of the
U.N., must comply with the U.N. Charter and its purposes, which focus
on territorial integrity, the pacific settlement of disputes, and the non-use
of force. It is the P.R.C.'s position that Taiwan violates its sovereignty
and territorial integrity by seeking independence and by, among other
things, purchasing scores of fighter jets, advanced radars, tanks, and air
defense systems from the U.S. 22 0 But the U.N. Charter does not permit
the P.R.C. to use force against Taiwan for its relationship with the U.S. 22 1
Nor does the Charter prohibit Taiwan from defending itself if the P.R.C.
commits an armed attack against it. 222
Because Taiwan's widespread relationships, any P.R.C. attempt to
forcibly reunify Taiwan is likely to face condemnation and potentially
collective self-defense. The P.R.C.-Taiwan conflict is different than the
conflict between Russia and Chechnya. In that case, the international
community supported Russia's use of force against Chechnya only
because states agreed Chechnya was within Russia's sovereign territory.
Because state recognition is legally ambiguous and inherently political,
if third-party states believed Chechnya was a state, and if invited by
Chechnya to help, they could have lawfully exercised collective self-

220. ICJ's Nicaragua case held that the U.S.' provision of arms to the contras were an
unlawful intervention into Nicaraguan sovereign affairs. According to the P.R.C. position on its
sovereignty over Taiwan, the U.S. sale of arms to Taiwan is also an unlawful intervention to the

P.R.C.'s affairs. Even if Taiwan was clearly part of the P.R.C.'s sovereign territory, the P.R.C.
cannot use a third party state's unlawful intervention as the basis for an armed attack against

Taiwan, because the ICJ stated that "a use of force of a lesser degree of gravity [than an armed
attack] cannot... produce any entitlement to take collective countermeasures involving the use of

force." Nicaragua Case, supra note 106, ¶ 249.
221. Id.
222. Article 51's pronouncement of the inherent right of individual and collective selfdefense for member states does not, by implication, state that only members can exercise this

right. Oppositely, it implied that the right belongs to all, irrespective of U.N. membership. Chan,
supra note 23, at 482.
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defense of Chechnya. 2 23 Under this circumstance, the third-party states
would accuse Russia of breaching the peace, and Russia would argue the
interventionists breached peace in its own sovereign territory. The
ambiguity of the law of state recognition, or its inherently political nature,
obfuscates the definitive legal answer to this issue.
Some may argue that if contested states are permitted to receive
collective self-defense it would incentivize secession attempts and
disrupt world order. The Council of the European Union argued that
contested states exercising collective self-defense would conflict with the
peaceful purposes of the U.N.22 4 Their position suggests that only the
U.N.'s collective decision-making is responsible for ensuring the pacific
settlement of disputes. This argument has some merit, but it fails to
acknowledge that the U.N. model, because of the P.R.C.'s seat on the
Security Council, cannot reasonably apply to the conflict between the
P.R.C. and Taiwan. Furthermore, if contested states may not exercise
collective self-defense without U.N. Security Council approval, then
permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, like China or Russia,
have an increased incentive to use armed force to settle their own
territorial disputes, or other territorial disputes, whenever and however
they please, which also violates the U.N. Charter. In Taiwan's case, the
only thing that may have stopped the P.R.C. from invading Taiwan over
the last fifty years is belief that the U.S. or other states can lawfully
exercise collective self-defense of the contested state.
This type of ambiguity about the rights of contested states suggests
that the prohibition on the use of force reigns supreme in customary
international law and the U.N. Charter. The prohibition on the use of
force in international relations is so central to world peace that it must be
matched with a corresponding right, even for contested states, to exercise
individual and collective self-defense, which, according to Grotius, is "so
tied to the instinct of self-preservation that it must transcend simple
customary international norms." 225
Therefore, if the P.R.C. commits an armed attack against Taiwan,
Taiwan would likely consider the attack as a breach of international peace
and security and resort to force to defend itself. If Taiwan wishes to
benefit from third-party collective self-defense, according to the
Nicaragua case, it must label itself a victim of an armed attack and
explicitly invite defense support from one or more third-party states. 2 2 6
223. U.N. Charter art. 2. It is the Author's assertion that the U.N. Charter does not strip
member states or non-member states' customary rights to self-defense, and the rights of contested
states are not clear.
224. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, supra note
110, at 282; see also Henderson, supra note 109 at 404.
225. Motala & ButleRitchie, supra note 102, at 12.

226. Nicaragua Case, supra note 106,

¶ 195.
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For the invited states, the exercise of collective self-defense will become
a political choice, just as political as the choice to recognize another state.
From the perspective of a third-party state, it can only defend a victim
of an armed attack if the victim is a state, otherwise it would violate the
parent state's territorial integrity. In the case of the U.S., which is
Taiwan's most important ally, it may lawfully act in collective selfdefense of Taiwan only if it formally recognizes Taiwan's statehood.
Presently, the U.S. treats Taiwan like a state in essentially every wayexcept formal recognition. The U.S. position on Taiwan is factually clear,
but not legally clear-the issue remains officially unsettled.
The U.S. does not recognize the P.R.C.'s claim of sovereignty over
Taiwan, and it treats Taiwan like a state, but that does not amount to the
formal recognition required for the U.S. to defend Taiwan. As discussed
above, the U.S.-P.R.C. joint communiques show that the U.S. has never
agreed with the P.R.C. position on Taiwan. In reality, the U.S.'
interactions with Taiwan, including its extensive arms sales, show that
the U.S. clearly rejects the P.R.C. position. The U.S. declared its intent to
sell arms to Taiwan early during the conflict, as seen in both the Taiwan
Relations Act of 1979 and the last U.S.-P.R.C. joint communique of
1982.227 During the presidencies of George W. Bush, Barrack Obama,
and Donald Trump, the U.S. has sold nearly $40 billion worth of military
equipment to Taiwan. 22 8 This sale of arms is evidence that the U.S. views
Taiwan as a state; any other interpretation of the arms sales would
describe the U.S. intervention as a clear violation of China's territorial
integrity. Yet arms sales and other evidence of the U.S.' de facto
recognition are insufficient to qualify Taiwan as a state with the right to
collective self-defense.
International law does not state the duration of time a third-party state
must recognize a victim state before it can receive collective self-defense.
It seems that this vagueness plays a significant role in the U.S.' policy of
"strategic ambiguity." The U.S. has not yet formally recognized Taiwan
because doing so would have immediate deleterious effects, against both
the U.S. and the people of Taiwan. 229 In 2019, Xi Jinping, the President
of the P.R.C., stated that Taiwan must "clearly recognise (sic) that
Taiwan's independence would only bring profound disaster to

227. 1982 Communique, supra note 56; see Taiwan Relations Act, supra note 49.
228. LAWRENCE, supra note 9, at 75-78.

229. Article 8 of the P.R.C. Anti-Secession Law states the P.R.C. will "employ non-peaceful
means and other necessary measures" to prevent the independence of Taiwan if Taiwan attempts
to secede or if any "major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China should occur." AntiSecession -Law, supra note 134, art. 8.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol32/iss1/3

44

Fisher: Defending Taiwan: Collective Self-Defense of a Contested State

DiFhNDING TAIWAN

20201

145

Taiwan." 23 0 If the P.R.C. commits an armed attack against Taiwan before
the U.S. formally recognizes it, that would not preclude the U.S. from
formally recognizing Taiwan and then defending it. If the U.S.
recognized Taiwan following a P.R.C. armed attack, and if the U.S.
recognition was soon accompanied by recognition from many or all of
the 57 other states with which Taiwan maintains informal relationships,
the argument that Taiwan is a state under the constitutive theory of state
recognition would grow even stronger. Therefore, the legal basis for the
U.S. or an international coalition's exercise of collective self-defense for
Taiwan would also be stronger. Such circumstances would be comparable
to the status of Vietnam, which was recognized by nearly 60 states, at the
time the U.S. entered the Vietnam War.
Nevertheless, if no other states join the U.S. in recognizing Taiwan
after a P.R.C. armed attack, the U.S.' defense of Taiwan would be no less
permissible because no single state or international body controls the
recognition, rights, or obligations of states. Under customary
international law, the right of individual and collective self-defense is
afforded to all states, and state recognition "is an optional and political
act and there is no legal duty in this regard." 23' The inherently subjective
nature of state recognition and states' rights is seen in one scholar's
observation that, "if an entity bears the marks of statehood[,] other states
put themselves at risk legally, if they ignore the basic obligations of state
relations." 232 Taiwan clearly bears the "marks of statehood," and a P.R.C.
armed attack against it would put not only the P.R.C., but potentially
many states worldwide, at great risk of harm.
CONCLUSION

The status quo relationship between the P.R.C. and Taiwan is tense,
but stable. Taiwan enjoys nearly all the rights of widely recognized states,
except for the benefits of membership in the U.N., World Health
Organization, and other international organizations.
As long as the P.R.C. continues to allow Taiwan to self-govern, and
as states maintain the "status quo," no military intervention or further
conflict is expected. It is unlikely that the P.R.C. will launch an
aggressive attack on Taiwan, but if it did, such an attack may be Taiwan's
only chance to gain formal recognition from third-party states because
states are otherwise unlikely to recognize Taiwan against the P.R.C.'s
looming threats of military force.
230. Lily Kuo, All Necessary Means: Xi Jinping Reserves Right to Use Force Against

Taiwan,

THE GUARDIAN

(Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/02/all-

necessary-means-xi-jinping-reserves-right-to-use-force-against-taiwan

[https://perma.cc/Z7ZK-

C7UA].
231. BROWNLIE, supra note 72, at 89.
232. Id. at 90.
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International law is vague about the rights and obligations of contested
states because state recognition is a political, not legal, determination.
Taiwan appears to meet all the requirements of statehood under the
declaratory theory and Montevideo Convention, and it meets many
aspects of the constitutive theory because of its formal and quasi-formal
relationships with over 70 nations. Additionally, Taiwan's de facto
recognition from the U.S. and so many other large nations grants it a
unique status that must be accompanied by both the rights and obligations
of a state.
The people of Taiwan are culturally distinct from the people of
Mainland China and they qualify for the right to self-determination, but
it is not beneficial for the Taiwanese to exercise rights under this
construct. The rights of self-determination can only be exercised under
the administration of a parent state, and the Taiwanese are unwilling to
accept any control by the P.R.C. government.
The prohibition on the use of force applies to the dispute between the
P.R.C. and Taiwan even though the P.R.C. claims Taiwan as its sovereign
territory. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibits the use of force in
international relations and any other use of force that compromises
international peace and security. Because Taiwan has the support of so
many states, Article 2(4) prohibits any use of force against it because such
force would likely breach international peace and security.
Lastly, although Taiwan is a contested state, it qualifies for the rights
of individual and collective self-defense because, according to the
perspective of many states, it meets both the declarative and constitutive
theory of state recognition. Third-party states may defend Taiwan only if
they formally recognize Taiwan as a state, otherwise, they may violate
the territorial integrity of the P.R.C. The U.S. and other states' unique
relationships with Taiwan show that they already treat Taiwan as a state,
nevertheless the U.S. and any other state must formally recognize Taiwan
before exercising collective self-defense on behalf of Taiwan.
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